fix(codex): escape-aware closing-quote scan, honest symlink coverage
readTomlMeta's trailing-comment stripper found the first quote character regardless of escaping, so a description containing \"escaped quotes\" before a real comment got silently truncated instead of dropped. The scan now skips a quote preceded by a backslash. The "never walks outside" containment test passed by construction (row.file is always built off a fixed root) and would not fail if the isUnder guard were removed. Replaced it with two tests that actually pin the regression risk: a skill dir and an agent .toml symlinked in from outside CODEX_HOME, asserting the row is discovered and its content read through the link. isUnder stays as a defensive check (matches cc-discovery.js), now commented as such.
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@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ describe("codex-discovery", () => {
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assert.equal(meta.description, "uses # for headings");
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});
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it("does not let an escaped quote before a real trailing comment truncate the value", () => {
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const meta = cx.readTomlMeta('description = "say \\"hi\\"" # not a comment\n');
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assert.equal(meta.description, 'say \\"hi\\"');
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});
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it("reads a rule file's preview", () => {
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write(
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path.join(TMP, "rules", "no-force-push.rules"),
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@@ -127,19 +132,33 @@ describe("codex-discovery", () => {
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assert.equal(project.exists, false);
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});
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it("follows a symlinked skill dir (a supported install pattern) without ever reporting a path outside the codex roots", () => {
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it("follows a skill directory symlinked in from outside CODEX_HOME — a supported install pattern", () => {
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const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "codex-disc-outside-"));
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write(path.join(outside, "SKILL.md"), "---\nname: linked\n---\nbody");
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fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(TMP, "skills", "linked"), "dir");
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const linkPath = path.join(TMP, "skills", "linked");
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fs.symlinkSync(outside, linkPath, "dir");
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const rows = cx.readSkills({ cwd: REPO });
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const linked = rows.find((r) => r.name === "linked");
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assert.ok(linked, "a symlinked skill directory must still be discovered");
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assert.equal(linked.frontmatter.name, "linked");
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for (const row of rows) {
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assert.ok(row.file.startsWith(TMP) || row.file.startsWith(REPO));
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assert.ok(!row.file.startsWith(outside));
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}
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const [linked] = cx.readSkills({ cwd: REPO, scope: "user" });
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assert.equal(linked.scope, "user");
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assert.equal(linked.name, "linked");
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assert.equal(linked.frontmatter.name, "linked", "frontmatter must be read through the link");
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assert.equal(linked.file, path.join(linkPath, "SKILL.md"));
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fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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it("follows an agent .toml symlinked in from outside CODEX_HOME", () => {
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const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "codex-disc-outside-"));
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const realFile = path.join(outside, "reviewer.toml");
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write(realFile, 'name = "reviewer"\n');
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const linkPath = path.join(TMP, "agents", "reviewer.toml");
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fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(linkPath), { recursive: true });
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fs.symlinkSync(realFile, linkPath, "file");
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const [agent] = cx.readAgents({ cwd: REPO, scope: "user" });
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assert.equal(agent.scope, "user");
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assert.equal(agent.name, "reviewer");
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assert.equal(agent.meta.name, "reviewer", "meta must be read through the link");
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assert.equal(agent.file, linkPath);
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fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ function readSkillsAt(scope, codexDir) {
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const skills = [];
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for (const ent of listDir(dir)) {
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const skillDir = path.join(dir, ent.name);
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// isUnder here is defensive only — ent.name comes from readdirSync and
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// can't carry a traversal segment, so this can never actually trip.
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if (!isDirLike(ent, skillDir) || !isUnder(codexDir, skillDir)) continue;
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const skillFile = path.join(skillDir, "SKILL.md");
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const read = safeReadText(skillFile);
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@@ -124,9 +126,16 @@ function readTomlMeta(text) {
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value = value.slice(1, -1);
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} else if (value.startsWith('"') || value.startsWith("'")) {
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// A quoted value with a trailing `# comment` outside the string —
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// e.g. model = "gpt-5.4" # default. Strip from the closing quote on.
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// e.g. model = "gpt-5.4" # default. Find the real closing quote
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// (skipping a `\"` escaped one) and strip everything after it.
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const quote = value[0];
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const closeIdx = value.indexOf(quote, 1);
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let closeIdx = -1;
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for (let i = 1; i < value.length; i++) {
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if (value[i] === quote && value[i - 1] !== "\\") {
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closeIdx = i;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (closeIdx > 0) value = value.slice(1, closeIdx);
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else continue;
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} else if (/^(true|false|-?\d+(\.\d+)?)\s*(#.*)?$/.test(value)) {
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@@ -146,6 +155,8 @@ function readAgentsAt(scope, codexDir) {
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for (const ent of listDir(dir)) {
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if (!ent.name.endsWith(".toml")) continue;
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const file = path.join(dir, ent.name);
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// isUnder here is defensive only — ent.name comes from readdirSync and
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// can't carry a traversal segment, so this can never actually trip.
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if (!isFileLike(ent, file) || !isUnder(codexDir, file)) continue;
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const read = safeReadText(file);
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if (!read) continue;
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@@ -177,6 +188,8 @@ function readRulesAt(scope, codexDir) {
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for (const ent of listDir(dir)) {
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if (!ent.name.endsWith(".rules")) continue;
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const file = path.join(dir, ent.name);
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// isUnder here is defensive only — ent.name comes from readdirSync and
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// can't carry a traversal segment, so this can never actually trip.
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if (!isFileLike(ent, file) || !isUnder(codexDir, file)) continue;
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const read = safeReadText(file);
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if (!read) continue;
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