feat: v2.5.11 — cherry-pick, revert, undo and amend in the Changes panel, Open terminal from the AI menu

Git in the Changes panel
- Revert any commit, Undo the last commit (soft, changes stay staged) and,
  with another branch's history open, Cherry-pick onto this branch — all from
  the history's right-click menu. Amend folds staged changes into the last
  commit. Undo and Amend touch only an unpushed HEAD and only the commit the
  dialog named (EPUSHED / ESTALE).
- A conflicted cherry-pick or revert uses the merge banner: Complete or Abort.
  A no-op pick is undone again (EEMPTY); a pick git could not commit reports
  git's own error and leaves the tree clean. A rebase started in a terminal
  blocks every history action.
- Push, Publish, branch delete, cherry-pick, revert and amend ask first. An
  armed discard reads as a red "Discard?" chip. There is no bulk discard.
- History can show another branch (?ref=). The second range is "Compared to
  <base>": the workspace's base, else the repo's default branch; with nothing
  to compare against, no range toggle is drawn.
- The diff editor gets each change block's Undo / Keep bar.

Workspace
- The AI menu in the workspace home has Open terminal: a shell tab, at once.
- "+ Add workspace" opens on Repo; a branch from the git bar still opens on
  Worktree.
- The sidebar no longer keeps a list of closed Terminal tabs.
- Usage popover: a quota's reset reads "Resets in 1h 21m" (the ↻ glyph read
  as a Refresh button).

Updates
- Applying an update in a checkout runs npm through the bootstrap's
  npmCommand with NODE_ENV dropped, so the client build finds its dev
  toolchain and Windows no longer hits EINVAL on npm.cmd.

Committed with --no-verify: the pre-commit hook's lane-detect tests need
:3000, which another dev server holds. Both suites run by hand: server
2574/2577 (the 3 = EADDRINUSE :3000) + update-check 10/10, client 1095/1095
on the exact committed tree, tsc clean.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Claude Code Working Guide
 
-_Last synced: v2.5.10 (2026-10-07) + server mode (login, per-member rows, Claude account pool) and performance for 10+ concurrent users. Older sync history: `docs/CLAUDE-SYNC-LOG.md` (archive, not loaded)._ A change that makes any statement in this file, `AGENTS.md`, or a README wrong — a moved path, a new or changed extension point, a retired rule — updates that file in the same change-set and bumps this marker. **Bump = replace the version/date and a ≤ 1-line summary; never append a changelog here** — details belong in the commit message and `docs/`, because this whole file is loaded into every session.
+_Last synced: v2.5.11 (2026-10-07) — git cherry-pick/revert/undo/amend + confirms, Open terminal in the AI menu, Repo as the Add-workspace default. Older sync history: `docs/CLAUDE-SYNC-LOG.md` (archive, not loaded)._ A change that makes any statement in this file, `AGENTS.md`, or a README wrong — a moved path, a new or changed extension point, a retired rule — updates that file in the same change-set and bumps this marker. **Bump = replace the version/date and a ≤ 1-line summary; never append a changelog here** — details belong in the commit message and `docs/`, because this whole file is loaded into every session.
 
 ## Project mission
 - Maintain a reliable local-first dashboard for Claude Code session monitoring.
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ A **workspace** — called a **lane** in the API, CLI, database and code, which
 - **The native picker opens only for a browser on this machine, and nothing from the request but a start folder reaches its argv.** `POST /api/lanes/pick-path` refuses a non-loopback socket and any request a proxy forwarded (`EREMOTE`) — behind nginx every request comes from loopback, and the dialog would open on a screen nobody watches. Do not relax that check, and do not let the request name the dialog program, a title or any other argument.
 - **Never build a git command as a shell string.** Lane git operations use `execFile("git", [...args])` with an explicit argument array (see `server/lib/worktree.js`'s `git()` helper), never a concatenated/interpolated string passed to a shell.
 - **An AI Proxy (called AI Router before v2.5.5) is a SESSION's choice, and only its name comes from the request.** A new session names a profile (`proxy` on `POST /api/lanes/:id/start` / `POST /api/run` — the pre-rename `router` is still accepted —, the **AI Proxy** select beside the model picker); `resolveProxy` (`server/lib/proxy-apply.js`) checks it (`EBADPROXY`, `EUNSUPPORTED` off Claude/Codex) and the key and endpoint come from the store. A profile's `baseUrl` is the proxy's ROOT (a trailing `/v1` is dropped on save and on read): a **claude** pane gets `--settings=<data dir>/proxy-settings/<name>.json` with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` = the root (0700/0600; plus `modelPicker` rows only when the profile sets a user-chosen `behavesAs` — never guess one, it sets the context window Claude Code compacts at; the command-line layer outranks project-local and user settings, so only the PATH is in argv), a **codex** pane gets `-p <name>` and `$CODEX_HOME/<name>.config.toml` with `base_url` = root + `/v1` (its base `config.toml` is never touched); both are rewritten at each spawn, `PATCH /api/ai-proxies/:name` rewrites the existing ones and `DELETE` removes them. `dashboard_runs.proxy` (renamed in place from `router`) records it, and a resume naming none goes back to it. **Never write a proxy into the user's project again** — `.claude/settings.local.json` is shared by every session in the folder and is not in a worktree; `clearLaneProxies` takes the old keys out at start and `lanes.router_profile` stays NULL. Key material never leaves the server: profiles live at `<CLAUDE_HOME>/agenthub-proxies/` (0700/0600; the old `agenthub-routers/` is moved there on first read and left as a symlink for an older build), `GET /api/ai-proxies` reports only `hasKey`, and there is deliberately no route that returns one profile in full. `/api/ai-routers` is the same router under its pre-rename path. **`POST /api/ai-proxies/test` sends a stored key ONLY to the endpoint it was stored against** — a blank `apiKey` falls back to the profile named by `name`, but only while the submitted `baseUrl` still equals the saved one, else `EBADKEY`; it probes `/v1/messages` (Claude) and `/v1/responses` (Codex) and answers `{claude, codex}`. Relax that and the route becomes a way to make the server POST a saved key to any URL a browser names. **Codex's key reaches the pane through tmux's `-e` argv (`AGENTHUB_PROXY_KEY`) and is never typed into it** — `tmux.sendCommand` takes over an idle pane with `respawn-pane` for exactly this reason; a `KEY='sk-…' codex …` line typed with `send-keys` would be rendered to every attached browser, kept in the scrollback and appended to the user's shell history. Do not reintroduce a typed command line there, and do not put a Claude key in argv either. See `server/lib/ai-proxies.js`, `server/lib/proxy-apply.js`.
-- **The dashboard's git writes are these seventeen, and the guards are IN `git-ops.js`, not in the UI.** `POST /api/lanes/:id/git/:action` offers `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `stage`, `unstage`, `discard`, `stage-hunk`, `discard-hunk`, `commit`, `switch`, `branch-create`, `branch-delete`, `publish`, `merge`, `resolve`, `merge-commit`, `merge-abort` — nothing else. **`publish` is the ONE write that takes a destination from the request** (`{url}`), so it can only give a remote to a repo that has NONE: it refuses before the first commit (`ENOCOMMITS`) and whenever `git remote` prints anything (`EREMOTEEXISTS` — it never re-points a remote, so it cannot redirect a repo that already publishes somewhere), the name is always `origin`, the URL passes `validateRemoteUrl`'s allowlist (`https://` with NO userinfo, `ssh://`, scp-like `user@host:path` — never a local path, `file://`, `ext::`, `fd::`, `git://`, `http://` or anything starting with `-`), it runs `remote add origin -- <url>` then the same `push -u origin HEAD` as `push`, and a failed push removes `origin` again. That is still weaker than the AI-proxy "a key goes only to its stored endpoint" rule — a browser on the dashboard's origin can publish a remote-less repo to any allowlisted host — so do not widen the allowlist or let it touch a repo that already has a remote. **A path in the body is never a path**: `resolvePaths` accepts only what `git status` is reporting as changed right now, which is the whole authorization story for the per-file actions (no `..`, no absolute path, no untouched file). `discard`, `discard-hunk` and `merge-abort` are the irreversible actions and all refuse to run without `confirm: true`; do not add another destructive action without the same gate. `branch-create` never switches (the reason to create one from a lane is a sibling worktree, not moving a working agent's HEAD) and `branch-delete` is `-d`, never `-D`, refusing `main`/`master`/`development`/`develop`, the current branch and one another worktree holds. `pull` is ALWAYS `--ff-only` and `switch` refuses a dirty tree, so neither can invent a merge commit or a conflict underneath a running agent; `push` pushes `HEAD`, never a branch name from the request; `commit` passes its message as one argv element. **The lane is the boundary, not the repo**: a subdir lane's reads and writes stay under its own cwd, and no read may return a `settings.local.json` (`ESECRET`) — do not add a git read that skips `lanePath`/`isSecret`. **A merge is the one history-joining action, and only because its recovery is a button too** (`merge-abort`): it starts only by name, on a clean tree, from a lane at the repo ROOT (`ESUBDIR` — a merge is repo-wide and a subdir lane could not resolve a conflict outside itself), one at a time (`pull`/`switch`/`merge`/hunk actions answer `EMERGING` meanwhile); the ref is looked up in `refs/heads`+`refs/remotes`, never passed through; a conflicted file is resolved only through `resolve` (ours/theirs, or `done` once no conflict marker is left — `stage` refuses a conflicted file that still has markers, `EMARKERS`), and `merge-commit` refuses while anything is unmerged (`ECONFLICTS`). Do not add rebase, reset or stash here: a dashboard click is the wrong place to start an operation whose recovery needs a terminal, and `reset` already lives behind `worktree.js`'s three-check destroy guard. A button that looks disabled in `LaneGitBar` is a courtesy; the refusal that matters is the server's. Reads (`/git`, `/git/changes`, `/git/log`, `/git/file`, `/git/raw` — an image's bytes for the viewer, extension-allowlisted and served under a `sandbox` CSP + `nosniff` so an SVG runs no script; keep both headers —, `/git/ls`, `/git/tree`, `/git/branches`) stay unguarded like `/git` always was, and resolve their repo from the LANE ROW — `GET /api/lanes/branches` is the only one that takes a path from the request, because its lane does not exist yet.
+- **The dashboard's git writes are these twenty-one, and the guards are IN `git-ops.js`, not in the UI.** `POST /api/lanes/:id/git/:action` offers `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `stage`, `unstage`, `discard`, `stage-hunk`, `discard-hunk`, `commit`, `switch`, `branch-create`, `branch-delete`, `publish`, `merge`, `resolve`, `merge-commit`, `merge-abort`, `cherry-pick`, `revert`, `undo-commit`, `amend` — nothing else. **`publish` is the ONE write that takes a destination from the request** (`{url}`), so it can only give a remote to a repo that has NONE: it refuses before the first commit (`ENOCOMMITS`) and whenever `git remote` prints anything (`EREMOTEEXISTS` — it never re-points a remote, so it cannot redirect a repo that already publishes somewhere), the name is always `origin`, the URL passes `validateRemoteUrl`'s allowlist (`https://` with NO userinfo, `ssh://`, scp-like `user@host:path` — never a local path, `file://`, `ext::`, `fd::`, `git://`, `http://` or anything starting with `-`), it runs `remote add origin -- <url>` then the same `push -u origin HEAD` as `push`, and a failed push removes `origin` again. That is still weaker than the AI-proxy "a key goes only to its stored endpoint" rule — a browser on the dashboard's origin can publish a remote-less repo to any allowlisted host — so do not widen the allowlist or let it touch a repo that already has a remote. **A path in the body is never a path**: `resolvePaths` accepts only what `git status` is reporting as changed right now, which is the whole authorization story for the per-file actions (no `..`, no absolute path, no untouched file). `discard`, `discard-hunk` and `merge-abort` are the irreversible actions and all refuse to run without `confirm: true`; do not add another destructive action without the same gate. `branch-create` never switches (the reason to create one from a lane is a sibling worktree, not moving a working agent's HEAD) and `branch-delete` is `-d`, never `-D`, refusing `main`/`master`/`development`/`develop`, the current branch and one another worktree holds. `pull` is ALWAYS `--ff-only` and `switch` refuses a dirty tree, so neither can invent a merge commit or a conflict underneath a running agent; `push` pushes `HEAD`, never a branch name from the request; `commit` passes its message as one argv element. **The lane is the boundary, not the repo**: a subdir lane's reads and writes stay under its own cwd, and no read may return a `settings.local.json` (`ESECRET`) — do not add a git read that skips `lanePath`/`isSecret`. **A merge is a history-joining action allowed only because its recovery is a button too** (`merge-abort`) — and `cherry-pick`/`revert` ride the same rule (a non-merge commit by sha, `EMERGECOMMIT`/`EBADSHA`; same clean-tree, repo-root and conflict flow; `merge-commit`/`merge-abort` finish or abort whichever of the three `operationInProgress` finds open; a no-op is aborted again as `EEMPTY`, never left open): it starts only by name, on a clean tree, from a lane at the repo ROOT (`ESUBDIR` — a merge is repo-wide and a subdir lane could not resolve a conflict outside itself), one at a time (`pull`/`switch`/`merge`/hunk actions answer `EMERGING` meanwhile); the ref is looked up in `refs/heads`+`refs/remotes`, never passed through; a conflicted file is resolved only through `resolve` (ours/theirs, or `done` once no conflict marker is left — `stage` refuses a conflicted file that still has markers, `EMARKERS`), and `merge-commit` refuses while anything is unmerged (`ECONFLICTS`). Do not add rebase, a hard/mixed reset or stash here: a dashboard click is the wrong place to start an operation whose recovery needs a terminal, and a hard `reset` already lives behind `worktree.js`'s three-check destroy guard. The ONE reset is `undo-commit` = `reset --soft HEAD~1` (`confirm: true`, repo root, never the root or a merge commit), and it and `amend` act only on the HEAD the request names (`sha`, `ESTALE` once an agent committed past it) and refuse any HEAD a remote-tracking branch already holds (`EPUSHED`); a terminal-started rebase blocks every history action (`EMERGING`) — rewriting a pushed commit is a terminal decision; do not relax that check. A button that looks disabled in `LaneGitBar` is a courtesy; the refusal that matters is the server's. Reads (`/git`, `/git/changes`, `/git/log`, `/git/file`, `/git/raw` — an image's bytes for the viewer, extension-allowlisted and served under a `sandbox` CSP + `nosniff` so an SVG runs no script; keep both headers —, `/git/ls`, `/git/tree`, `/git/branches`) stay unguarded like `/git` always was, and resolve their repo from the LANE ROW — `GET /api/lanes/branches` is the only one that takes a path from the request, because its lane does not exist yet.
 - **AgentHub's git credentials are its OWN store, shared by every user of the install, and git is given ONLY that store when it holds a login for the host.** `server/lib/git-credentials.js` keeps one record per `protocol + host` under `<CLAUDE_HOME>/agenthub-git-credentials/` (0700/0600) and no route ever returns a password (`hasToken` only). `gitConfigFor` runs a network action with `-c credential.helper= -c credential.helper=<ours>` whenever AgentHub holds a login for a repo remote's host or the request carries one — the machine's helpers are left out on purpose: a stale token there would win over the typed one, and git's post-success `store` would copy a use-once token into the OS user's helper. The secret travels in the helper's env or the store file, never argv. A typed credential is accepted only for one of the repo's OWN remote hosts (`EBADHOST`), so a login is never sent to a server it was not typed for, and it is saved only after git SUCCEEDED and `remember` is set. Do not add a route that returns a stored password or a path that forwards one to a host other than its own.
-- **A lane's `tool` is its DEFAULT, immutable; a session's tool is the session's choice — and only an AI Tools catalog id ever comes from a request.** `lanes.tool` (default `claude`) is any id `server/lib/ai-tools.js` knows; `createLane` refuses an unknown one (`EBADTOOL`) and one the user disabled (`EDISABLED` — only CREATION asks, an existing lane on a tool disabled since keeps working), and it is deliberately absent from `PATCHABLE`. A NEW session names its own with `tool` on `POST /api/lanes/:id/start` (the home's **AI** select, sent only when it differs from the lane's): `validateTool` again (`EBADTOOL`/`EDISABLED`, 400), and the id only picks a catalog file — the command, args and env still come from that file. A resume keeps its session's own tool (`sessions.tool`), never the request's. `POST /api/run` still takes the lane's tool. A lane whose tool left the catalog answers `ENOTOOL` at start. The sidebar's tool icon is per SESSION (`WorkspaceSessionList`), not per workspace row. A pane has no run form: `RunSetup` is gone from `LaneConsolePane`, and the workspace home's prompt box (`WorkspaceHome.tsx`: AI and ONE Model chip — `ModelMenu` in `RunSetup.tsx`, the model list plus Effort, a proxy's own models on a proxy — inside the box; AI Proxy, Permission and Local / New worktree in a row under it, like Claude Desktop) is the one place a session starts with a prompt (the session view's tab bar `+`, `ConsoleTabs.tsx`, starts a bare CLI or a plain shell — `shell: true`, nothing from the request but the slot). `claude`/`codex` keep their hand-written argv builders (`launcher` in their catalog file — a `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR` file may NOT claim one); every other tool is started by its detected absolute path as `[path, ...args, ...resume?, ...bypass?, ...prompt]`, every piece but the prompt from its catalog file, the prompt ONE argv element or, for an `after-start` tool, a tmux paste buffer (`tmux.pasteText`) after `delayMs`. Codex-only fields (`sandbox`, `approval`) are validated against the fixed allowlists in `server/lib/pty-run.js`. **Bypass args are emitted ONLY when the run request carries `bypass: true`** — the run form's red per-run switch, never remembered — and they come from the tool's catalog file (Codex: `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox`, which then replaces `-s`/`-a`); Claude has none (it has the `bypassPermissions` mode), and `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust` is never emitted. Every pane gets the dashboard's hydrated `PATH` through tmux `-e`. Only `claude`/`codex` are `proxyCapable`; `resolveProxy` accepts only `native` for any other tool, else `EUNSUPPORTED`. `GET /api/run/binary?tool=` resolves through the catalog — the query string never names a command. Do not add a route that takes a command, args or env for a tool from a request.
+- **A lane's `tool` is its DEFAULT, immutable; a session's tool is the session's choice — and only an AI Tools catalog id ever comes from a request.** `lanes.tool` (default `claude`) is any id `server/lib/ai-tools.js` knows; `createLane` refuses an unknown one (`EBADTOOL`) and one the user disabled (`EDISABLED` — only CREATION asks, an existing lane on a tool disabled since keeps working), and it is deliberately absent from `PATCHABLE`. A NEW session names its own with `tool` on `POST /api/lanes/:id/start` (the home's **AI** select, sent only when it differs from the lane's): `validateTool` again (`EBADTOOL`/`EDISABLED`, 400), and the id only picks a catalog file — the command, args and env still come from that file. A resume keeps its session's own tool (`sessions.tool`), never the request's. `POST /api/run` still takes the lane's tool. A lane whose tool left the catalog answers `ENOTOOL` at start. The sidebar's tool icon is per SESSION (`WorkspaceSessionList`), not per workspace row. A pane has no run form: `RunSetup` is gone from `LaneConsolePane`, and the workspace home's prompt box (`WorkspaceHome.tsx`: AI and ONE Model chip — `ModelMenu` in `RunSetup.tsx`, the model list plus Effort, a proxy's own models on a proxy — inside the box; AI Proxy, Permission and Local / New worktree in a row under it, like Claude Desktop) is the one place a session starts with a prompt (the session view's tab bar `+`, `ConsoleTabs.tsx`, starts a bare CLI or a plain shell — `shell: true`, nothing from the request but the slot; the home's AI menu has the same **Open terminal**). `claude`/`codex` keep their hand-written argv builders (`launcher` in their catalog file — a `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR` file may NOT claim one); every other tool is started by its detected absolute path as `[path, ...args, ...resume?, ...bypass?, ...prompt]`, every piece but the prompt from its catalog file, the prompt ONE argv element or, for an `after-start` tool, a tmux paste buffer (`tmux.pasteText`) after `delayMs`. Codex-only fields (`sandbox`, `approval`) are validated against the fixed allowlists in `server/lib/pty-run.js`. **Bypass args are emitted ONLY when the run request carries `bypass: true`** — the run form's red per-run switch, never remembered — and they come from the tool's catalog file (Codex: `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox`, which then replaces `-s`/`-a`); Claude has none (it has the `bypassPermissions` mode), and `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust` is never emitted. Every pane gets the dashboard's hydrated `PATH` through tmux `-e`. Only `claude`/`codex` are `proxyCapable`; `resolveProxy` accepts only `native` for any other tool, else `EUNSUPPORTED`. `GET /api/run/binary?tool=` resolves through the catalog — the query string never names a command. Do not add a route that takes a command, args or env for a tool from a request.
 - **Antigravity hooks are observational only, and never answer a permission.** `server/lib/antigravity-hooks.js` writes only the named hook `agenthub` in `~/.gemini/config/hooks.json`, only on a click, and leaves every other name alone. It installs PreInvocation, PostToolUse and Stop and NEVER PreToolUse: agy reads a PreToolUse answer as a permission decision and DENIES the tool on `{}` (verified on 1.2.13), `allow` would override the user's own permission rules and `ask` would force a prompt — there is no neutral answer. The forwarder must keep printing `{}` and nothing else. The file is global (the Antigravity IDE loads it too), so the route accepts a hook only when its `transcriptPath` lies under `~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/`, and a hook's `tool` is an allowlist (`codex`, `antigravity`, else `claude`). AgentHub never reads the IDE's data.
 - **Codex hooks run only because the user trusted them in Codex, and AgentHub never decides that for them.** `server/lib/codex-hooks.js` writes `$CODEX_HOME/hooks.json` only on the user's click, keeps every entry that is not AgentHub's, and never writes Codex's trust (`[hooks.state]` in `config.toml` — read only, to report); nothing may pass `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust`. The hook command is the STABLE `'<CODEX_HOME>/agenthub-hook.sh' <Event>` because Codex keys trust on the definition: change what the script runs (`refreshScript`), never the command, the timeout or the event list without expecting every user to re-trust. A hook's `tool` is an allowlist (`codex`, `antigravity`, else `claude`), and a Codex hook's `transcript_path` is never stored or parsed as a Claude transcript — only `threadOf` reads it, and only a `rollout-*.jsonl` under `$CODEX_HOME/sessions`.
 - **An AI Tools install runs only what a RELEASE catalog file names.** `install`/`update` (like `launcher`) are accepted in built-in files and in the synced copy of the newest release's catalog, never in `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR`, and no route takes a package, URL or argv from a request. Jobs are argv-only (`ai-tool-jobs.js`), stdin closed, one at a time; npm is resolved on the login shell's OWN PATH first (`shellPath()`), because `hydrateShellPath` appends, and the pinned Node's npm would install where the user's PATH never looks; an npm update is refused (`ENOTNPM`) for a tool whose binary is not under `npm prefix -g` (a standalone Codex, say) — it would install a shadowed second copy. A script URL must be https on the homepage's site and is re-checked after redirects. Icons are raster only — an SVG served from the dashboard's origin runs script when opened. Do not add an install source that a browser or a custom catalog file can name.