Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nntrivi2001 84e2a9f0ac feat(server-s3): one Linux user per account (S3) — experimental
Server mode can now run each account as its own Linux user (ah-<name>)
when `agenthub server install-system` has set S3 up. The dashboard
reaches a member only through sudo -u / write-as / pane-launch, reads a
member's files only through owner- and type-checked opens, and hooks
are authenticated by peer uid. Local mode and server mode without S3
are unchanged.

EXPERIMENTAL: tested with fake sudo and fake accounts only. It has not
yet been verified on a real install with real member accounts, sudo or
a real Codex login. Do not offer it to real users yet.

- S3 core: provisioning, per-member tmux servers, the proxy key
  gateway, shared tools in /opt, dropped capabilities for children
  (P0–P5)
- P4: plan and quota per member home
- P6: ~/.claude.json seed; opt-in plugin baseline installed as the
  member; managed-settings spike script (not run)
- P7: Codex account pool (`agenthub accounts add --tool codex`)
- Roles merged with main's admin / analyst / developer: analysts write
  only their own rows, under S3 as well
- Per-account prefs: one implementation (Chat UI + onboarding)
- Security reviews F1–F49 (five rounds), each fix with a regression
  test: symlink/TOCTOU-safe member reads, no host writes in a member
  home, credentials and the data dir never served, owner and folder
  account must agree, pane tokens bound to the pane's uid, bounded
  sudo/tmux/git calls and member reads (no hang or crash from a member),
  async route rejections answer 500 instead of exiting
- Docs: docs/SERVER-MODE.md (S3 model, accepted ceilings, operator
  runbook), docs/plans/server-mode/S3-PLAN.md, CLAUDE.md S3 rules

Tests: server 2838/2841 (3 need 127.0.0.1:3000, held on this box);
client 1162/1162; tsc clean; headers check passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 14:57:10 +07:00
nntrivi2001 acff059e92 fix(codex-config): close whole-branch review defects in the Codex panel
Plugins/marketplaces GET routes were silently empty because codex-cli.js
never unwrapped the CLI's {installed,available}/{marketplaces} objects
into arrays; backup writes bypassed the symlink-escape guard entirely;
readFileSafe was stricter than every other Codex reader, showing a
symlinked skill/rule in the list and then refusing to open it;
marketplaceAdd only accepted http(s) URLs, rejecting owner/repo sources
the CLI itself takes. Also: docs drift, a dead i18n key, and a scope-cast
hazard in the shared Editor/ConfirmDelete modals.

Fixes, one per finding: unwrap installed/marketplaces in codex-cli.js so
every list route keeps returning a bare list; guard the backup path in
codex-mutate.js with the same assertNotSymlinkEscape the write path
already used (Claude's cc-mutate.js has no such guard on its primary
write path either, so left untouched there); relax readFileSafe's
containment to lexical-only, matching the other four Codex readers,
while leaving the write side's realpath check untouched; reuse
cc-plugin-cli's assertSource for marketplaceAdd instead of a third
validator (ssh remains out of scope, no credential story for it yet).

Server: 1557/1557 (was 1548). Client: tsc -b clean, 469/469 tests.
2026-09-09 01:17:06 +07:00
nntrivi2001 aca8fd02ee fix(codex): stop 502ing empty CLI output, GET /file no longer mkdirs or leaks paths 2026-09-08 20:15:12 +07:00
nntrivi2001 29ed86d672 fix(codex): close symlink escape on GET /file, pin project writes to server cwd 2026-09-08 20:07:57 +07:00
nntrivi2001 b0788eea80 fix(codex): backslash parity in the TOML closing-quote scan
Round 2's escape check rejected a quote whenever a single backslash
preceded it, so an escaped backslash before a real closing quote (e.g.
path = "path\\" # c) was misread as an escaped quote and the field was
dropped. Now counts the run of backslashes and only treats an ODD run as
escaping the quote. Folded the old two-branch quote handling into one
scan (it already finds the terminator correctly with or without a
trailing comment) and decode \\ -> \ in the extracted value, since the
scan already knows which backslash run is real.
2026-09-08 16:57:02 +07:00
nntrivi2001 236e94760f fix(codex): escape-aware closing-quote scan, honest symlink coverage
readTomlMeta's trailing-comment stripper found the first quote character
regardless of escaping, so a description containing \"escaped quotes\"
before a real comment got silently truncated instead of dropped. The scan
now skips a quote preceded by a backslash.

The "never walks outside" containment test passed by construction (row.file
is always built off a fixed root) and would not fail if the isUnder guard
were removed. Replaced it with two tests that actually pin the regression
risk: a skill dir and an agent .toml symlinked in from outside CODEX_HOME,
asserting the row is discovered and its content read through the link.
isUnder stays as a defensive check (matches cc-discovery.js), now commented
as such.
2026-09-08 16:48:45 +07:00
nntrivi2001 98b1921ca6 fix(codex): keep commented TOML fields, follow symlinked config surfaces
readTomlMeta was dropping any field with a trailing `# comment` (common in
real agents/*.toml). readSkills/readAgents/readRules used bare
isDirectory()/isFile(), which miss symlinked entries per cc-discovery.js's
own documented Dirent quirk — reused its isDirLike/isFileLike instead
(exporting isDirLike from cc-discovery.js, which wasn't previously public).
Also swapped the "never walks outside" test for one that actually exercises
a symlink escape, and dropped the unnecessary isUnder re-export.
2026-09-08 16:41:46 +07:00
nntrivi2001 7618766861 feat(codex): read the Codex config surfaces 2026-09-08 16:32:06 +07:00