AgentHub/docs/SERVER-MODE.md

Server mode

AgentHub has one codebase and two ways to run it:

	Local mode (default)	Server mode
Who uses it	You, on your own machine	Several people over the web
Login	None (the loopback bind is the trust boundary)	Every page, API call and WebSocket needs one
Turn on	Nothing to do: every install starts here	agenthub server setup
Extra code loaded	None: /api/auth/me answers {mode: "local"} and nothing else changes	server/lib/auth.js, the login page

Local mode does not change at all. The login code stays dormant until AGENTHUB_MODE=server is set.

What server mode separates, and what it does not. In the dashboard and its API, each developer sees only their own workspaces and the sessions, prompts, events, tokens and cost under them (see What each user sees). Until one Linux user per account is installed (agenthub server install-system), every terminal pane runs as the one Linux account that runs the dashboard. An agent in a pane can then read every user's folders, transcripts and the database straight from disk. Without it, use server mode only with people you trust.

Set it up

On the machine that will host the dashboard, logged in as the account that runs it:

# 1. Turn server mode on, allow the public name, and create the first admin
agenthub server setup --hostname agenthub.example.com --admin boss
#    (asks for the admin's password twice; from a script: pipe it on stdin)

# 2. Restart the dashboard so it picks the mode up
systemctl --user restart agenthub     # or: agenthub start

# 3. Add the other people
agenthub users add alice                      # developer
agenthub users add carol --role analyst       # reads everyone, works in their own

setup writes AGENTHUB_MODE=server and DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS into AgentHub's settings file (~/.config/agenthub/settings.env). The real environment and a checkout's .env still take priority over that file. Run setup again whenever you need to: it creates an admin only when none exists.

Put HTTPS in front of it

Keep the dashboard on its default loopback bind (do not set DASHBOARD_HOST) and serve it through a reverse proxy on the same machine. The proxy has to:

• pass the original Host (the dashboard checks it against DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS and compares it with the browser's Origin);
• forward WebSocket upgrades (/ws for live updates, /ws-pty/* for terminals);
• set X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-Proto.

nginx:

server {
  listen 443 ssl;
  server_name agenthub.example.com;
  ssl_certificate     /etc/ssl/agenthub.crt;
  ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/agenthub.key;

  location / {
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:4820;
    proxy_http_version 1.1;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
    proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
    proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
    proxy_read_timeout 1d;
  }
}

The login cookie gets Secure when the request came over HTTPS (X-Forwarded-Proto: https).

Roles

Role	Can
admin	Everything, including the host's own configuration and every user's data
analyst	Reads everything (usage, prompts, every user's sessions), and works in their OWN workspaces like a developer. Never changes another user's rows or the host's configuration
developer	Their own workspaces: start sessions, terminals, git, files. Sees nothing of other users, and cannot open or change the host's configuration

developer was called member before; a database with members is migrated on start (server/db.js), and member is no longer accepted.

"The host's configuration" means a write (anything but GET/HEAD) under /api/settings, /updates, /cc-config, /codex-config, /git-credentials, /ai-tools, /import, /pricing, /budgets, /webhooks, /remote-sources, /reports, /pets, /users and /alerts/rules (ADMIN_WRITE_PREFIXES in server/lib/auth.js), plus a write to a shared AI Proxy (see AI Proxy profiles). A developer or analyst who tries one gets 403 EADMIN, shown in the UI as "Only an admin can do this". An analyst's other writes are scoped like a developer's: one naming another user's row gets 404 ENOTFOUND (memberId in server/lib/scope.js limits every non-GET request of an analyst to their own rows), and under S3 an analyst's workspace runs as their own Linux account exactly like a developer's.

The UI hides what a role cannot use (usePermissions in client/src/components/AuthGate.tsx): for anyone but an admin, Settings shows no Data, Pricing or per-tool pages, no scheduled reports or git credentials, no start-at-login/icon/Quit/Uninstall on System, no alert rules or channels, no install/update/enable on AI tools, no pet upload or delete, and no update check; the AI proxy page shows them only their personal profiles' Edit. An analyst's Workspace page and sidebar list only their own workspaces (useWorkLanes); other users' work is read on Sessions, Analytics and Users, where Resume, Fork, Snapshot and "Open in workspace" are hidden for a session that is not theirs. The sidebar's workspace list shows an admin or analyst EVERY workspace, grouped under its owner (each lane carries owner_name and owner_display_name; the group shows the display name when the owner set one, else the username; yours first, no owner last, each group folds): for an analyst another user's workspace there is read only — no menu, rename or new session, no live tabs, and a session opens its analysis page (/sessions/<id>). An analyst's alert feed (GET /api/alerts) carries can_ack on each alert — true only for their own sessions' — and the feed offers Acknowledge only there; Ack all acknowledges only theirs.

What each user sees

Every workspace has an owner: the user who created it (lanes.owner_id). Workspaces made before server mode, or by the host account, have none.

• A session belongs to the workspace that owns it: sessions.lane_id, or the workspace whose pane holds it. Its agents, events, tokens, cost, alerts, snapshots and workflow runs belong to that session.
• A developer sees only rows of their own workspaces, everywhere: lists, counts, charts, cost, the Sessions/Events/Agents tables, exports, live WebSocket updates and terminals. A request naming someone else's row (in the path, the query or the body) gets 404 ENOTFOUND, the same answer as a row that does not exist (scopeGuard, server/lib/scope.js). Sessions with no workspace, such as ones started in a terminal outside AgentHub, are not shown to developers.
• An admin or analyst sees everything. Each time one of them opens a session a developer owns (its page, transcript, events or cost), the read is written to the audit log: agenthub users audit, or GET /api/users/audit.
• GET /api/users (admin/analyst) lists every account with its workspaces, sessions, and the tokens and $ it used in the last 7 and 30 days — the Users page in the sidebar shows it, with the audit log under it.

A developer also cannot open the host's own configuration, or any view across all users: Claude Code / Codex config (except the command and skill lists the prompt box uses), the AI tools' config files (/api/ai-tools/<id>/config…), git credentials, remote sources, webhooks, reports, metrics, imports, data export, alert rules and /api/users. Those return 403 EADMIN, and Settings hides them for developers. The command and skill lists show a developer only their own workspaces' project items: ?cwd= outside one of them answers 403 EFOLDER, and with no cwd they list no project items at all.

AI Proxy profiles

Each user may keep personal AI Proxy profiles beside the shared ones:

• A developer's or analyst's new profile is always personal. An admin's is shared unless they choose Only me (personal) in the form (scope: "personal").
• A personal profile is named u<user id>_<slug>. Only its owner lists, edits, deletes or tests it, and only the owner's workspaces can start a session on it. Anyone else, an admin included, gets 404, the same answer as a profile that does not exist. A resume of a session that ran on someone else's personal profile goes back to native.
• Only an admin writes a shared profile. Everyone can choose one.
• No pane is given a proxy's key, and no route returns one.
  • A session's CLI talks to AgentHub's own loopback gateway, http://127.0.0.1:<port>/api/proxy-gw/<profile>/v1/…. Its key there is its pane's token (ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN for Claude, AGENTHUB_PROXY_KEY for Codex).
  • AgentHub swaps in the real key and streams the request to the profile's endpoint.
  • The gateway answers only on this machine, only while the pane lives, and only for the profile the pane was started on.
  • An agent can still spend through the profile while its pane runs, but it cannot carry the key away.
  • Claude account-pool tokens are not covered: they still reach the pane (see Claude account pool).

Keep developers' folders apart

# in ~/.config/agenthub/settings.env
AGENTHUB_USERS_ROOT=/srv/agenthub/users

With this set, a developer or analyst can create a workspace only inside /srv/agenthub/users/<username>; any other folder gets 403 EFOLDER. The same root limits a developer's folder browser (GET /api/lanes/browse, which opens on their own folder) and GET /api/lanes/branches, both judged by real path, so a link cannot point them elsewhere. Under S3 the home itself is no workspace (its dot folders hold the member's logins); use a folder in it. A folder that already belongs to another user's workspace gets 409 EOWNED. Admins are not limited. Without one Linux user per account you create each user's folder yourself, and this keeps workspaces apart, not agents. install-system sets this value to /srv/agenthub/users, and adding a user makes the folder (it is the Linux account's home). With S3 installed, a settings file that lacks the variable falls back to USERS_ROOT in /etc/agenthub/server.conf, so a developer is never shown the host's home.

What the gate does

• /api/health and /api/auth/* answer without a login. Everything else under /api answers 401 EAUTH until someone logs in, and the UI shows the login page. Paths are checked the way Express routes them: decoded, with repeated slashes collapsed, and case-insensitive.
• The login page follows the OS's light/dark. After a login the dashboard wears that account's own appearance (Settings → Appearance, saved in /api/me/prefs); an account that never chose one follows the OS.
• Hooks (/api/hooks/*) are accepted only from this machine: a loopback socket with no forwarding header. A request through the proxy gets 403 ELOCALONLY. POST /api/hooks/ingest-batch keeps its own bearer token.
• Every write (any method but GET/HEAD) that carries an Origin or Referer must name the dashboard's own allowed host, or loopback. Anything else gets 403 EBADORIGIN. This is on top of the SameSite=Strict cookie, which a sibling subdomain would still satisfy.
• WebSockets need a login, and an Origin that is the request's own allowed Host. A terminal (/ws-pty/*) is refused to anyone but an admin and the owner of the pane's workspace (an analyst included). Open sockets are re-checked: /ws every 30 s, terminals every 10 s (AGENTHUB_PTY_RECHECK_MS). A logout, a disable, a password change, or losing the pane's workspace closes them.
• A login lasts 30 days in the httpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie agenthub_sid. Only the token's SHA-256 is stored. Logging out, a password change and disabling the user each end it.
• Passwords are stored as scrypt hashes; any non-empty password is accepted (no minimum length). Every login attempt counts before its password is checked, so attempts sent in parallel count too. After 10 failed logins from one address, or 30 for one username, in 15 minutes, further logins answer 429 ETOOMANY until the window passes. The counters are kept in memory, so a restart resets them.
• Inside a pane, the agenthub CLI, the MCP server and the statusline act as the owner of the pane's workspace. Each pane the dashboard starts gets its own AGENTHUB_PANE_TOKEN through tmux -e, and the database stores only its hash (dashboard_runs.pane_token_hash). The token is accepted only from this machine and only while that pane is alive, as header x-agenthub-pane-token (with one Linux user per account on: only from the Linux account that pane runs as, read from the kernel like a hook's sender). A workspace with no owner has no such user. Give old workspaces an owner with agenthub users assign <workspace id> <user>. With one Linux user per account on, a workspace inside a member's home can be owned by that member only, and one outside the users root (its panes run as the host account) by an admin only: creating, assigning or starting one against that answers 409 EOWNERFOLDER — by the user's role at that moment, and demoting or disabling a user ends their panes that run as the host. A pane's folder must be its workspace's account's too (409 ECWDACCOUNT).
• Named locks (agenthub lock …) are per user: a developer's lock names live in their own namespace, so one user's agents never see or take another's.
• Browser push subscriptions belong to the user who made them. A notification goes only to that user's own browsers, never to the host's desktop.
• A developer or analyst cannot create a session by hand (POST /api/sessions → 403), and cannot change a workspace's pane or session columns: PATCH accepts only title, pipeline, notes, links and branch (403 EFIELD). Pet uploads are admin-only.
• The native file picker stays local-only (EREMOTE) and every page falls back to its folder browser.

Accounts

An admin manages accounts on the Users page (sidebar; admins and analysts see it, an analyst only reads): Add user, and one Edit form per account that changes, in a single save, its display name and email, role, active/disabled, password (typed or generated), the workspaces it owns (give one, or take one back — it is then left with no owner) and "sign out everywhere". Every field is checked before any is written, so a bad email or a workspace the user does not own changes nothing. Every change asks for the admin's OWN password again — the server refuses without it (EREAUTH, and ETOOMANY after 10 wrong tries in 15 minutes) — an admin can never demote or disable themselves (ESELF), and each change is written to the audit log. In local mode these routes refuse (ELOCALMODE): there is no login to check.

Wherever the dashboard names a person — the sidebar's sign-out tooltip, the workspace list's owner groups, the Users page and its audit log, the Edit user form — it shows their display name when one is set, else the username (the Users page keeps @username beside a display name). Logging in, the CLI and the Linux account always use the username.

Under S3 an admin's folder browser opens on their own home too; ticking Server folder opens the host account's home (/home/<host>), where a workspace runs as the host account that every admin shares. The tick is never remembered, so the default is always the admin's own account.

Every signed-in user has Settings → Account: their username, role, member since, workspace and session counts and active logins; their own display name and email; Change password (the current password is required, the login it is changed from stays and every other one ends); and Sign out other devices. These are taken from the login cookie only — an agent in a pane, which acts as its workspace owner through its pane token, cannot change its owner's password or logins.

The same from the host's shell:

agenthub users list
agenthub users add <name> [--role admin|analyst|developer]
agenthub users passwd <name>        # ends that user's logins
agenthub users role <name> <role>
agenthub users disable <name>       # ends that user's logins; users are never deleted
agenthub users enable <name>
agenthub users assign <workspace id> <name>   # give a pre-server-mode workspace an owner
agenthub users audit [--limit N]    # who read which developer's session
agenthub server status

Claude account pool

An admin can sign every Claude account the company has into AgentHub. Each new Claude session then runs on the account with the most room left, and nobody has to log in or switch accounts by hand. The pool works in local mode too, and it stays empty (changing nothing) until you add an account.

# Once per account: sign in as that account and make a one-year token
claude setup-token
# Add it to the pool (the token is typed hidden, or piped on stdin)
agenthub accounts add team-1
agenthub accounts list        # live panes, $ in the last 5 h / 7 d, quota, state
agenthub accounts remove team-1

In server mode an admin can do the same on the Users page, in the Account pool card: Add account and the bin icon to remove one. A Claude account comes from one of three sources:

• A saved login: a profile from Settings → Claude config → Switch account (log in with claude auth login, then save it). It is MOVED into the pool, so the profile leaves the switcher. The account this server's own Claude Code is logged into can be moved in too. It moves with the login the CLI holds right now, keeps working on the server, and the server's own .credentials.json becomes one more home the pool refreshes and writes into, keeping its other keys. Only a login kept in the macOS Keychain is refused (EACTIVE). Removing that account later leaves the server logged in.
• A pasted .credentials.json: from ~/.claude/.credentials.json, or on a Mac security find-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" -w. Stop using that login where you copied it from.
• A claude setup-token token (sk-ant-…), as with agenthub accounts add.

A Codex account is an OpenAI API key, or the whole ~/.codex/auth.json after codex login.

A login (the first two sources) works like a Codex ChatGPT login. Claude Code reads it from no env var, so before a member's pane starts, AgentHub writes it as that member's ~/.claude/.credentials.json, as the member (0600). It is never written into a host pane's home, never over a login the member made themselves, and never a second account into a home where a pane of theirs runs on one. Host panes therefore get only setup-token accounts. The refresh token of a login is single use, so the server is the one that refreshes it, before it expires (claude-pool.refreshLogins, checked every 60 s; DASHBOARD_POOL_REFRESH_MS=0 turns it off). It then writes the new pair into every home it placed the login in, and Claude Code picks up tokens another process refreshed. A pair a member's Claude refreshed first is copied back only after Anthropic confirms it is the same account. Removing the account deletes it from the homes that still hold AgentHub's copy. Each change asks for the admin's own password again and is written to the audit log by account name. The token only goes in; the page, like agenthub accounts list, never shows it again. An analyst sees the card read-only; a developer does not see it. Every user shares the pool: a user created later needs no setup of their own.

How a new session picks its account (server/lib/claude-pool.js):

1. An account whose last quota reading is at or above 90% in the 5-hour or weekly window goes last. It is still used if every account is that full.
2. Next, the account with the fewest live panes, so concurrent sessions spread out.
3. Then the account with the least $ spent in the last 5 hours, then the last 7 days. AgentHub sums this from the usage of the sessions it started on each account (dashboard_runs.account).

• The pane gets the token through tmux -e CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=…. That token outranks the machine's own /login for that process only.
• A session on an AI Proxy keeps the proxy's key and does not use the pool.
• With one Linux user per account (S3), a member's home starts empty, and a fresh Claude Code shows its "Select login method" screen even with the token set. So before a member's pane starts on a pool account or an AI Proxy, AgentHub adds hasCompletedOnboarding: true to that member's ~/.claude.json, written as the member, with every other key kept (run-as.markClaudeOnboarded). With an empty pool and no proxy, a member's pane still needs that member's own /login.
• A token more than a year old is skipped.
• A resumed session picks an account again, like a new one.
• Quota is read with each account's own token, in the background, at most every 5 minutes. If the usage endpoint refuses a setup-token, the state column shows no quota (…) and ranking uses spend alone.
• GET /api/accounts returns the same table, without tokens.

Ceiling: anyone with a terminal in AgentHub can read the token of the account their pane runs on (echo $CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN). Without one Linux user per account they can also read every file of the pool. With it, they still see their own pane's token (a member's pane gets it through its launch file instead of tmux -e), but no other account's process or file. The AI Proxy gateway does not cover pool tokens.

Codex account pool

The same for Codex (server/lib/codex-pool.js), with two kinds of account:

# An OpenAI API key (typed hidden, or piped on stdin)
agenthub accounts add team-key --tool codex --api-key
# A ChatGPT account: sign in in a scratch home, then hand that home over
CODEX_HOME=$(mktemp -d) codex login
agenthub accounts add team-chatgpt --tool codex --from /tmp/tmp.XXXX
agenthub accounts list --tool codex
agenthub accounts remove team-key --tool codex

• API key: any number of panes at once. The pane gets the key through tmux -e AGENTHUB_POOL_KEY=…, and Codex is pointed at it with -c model_providers.agenthub_pool={…env_key="AGENTHUB_POOL_KEY"…} — the argv names the variable, never the key.
• ChatGPT: Codex reads this login only from $CODEX_HOME/auth.json, so it is used only for a pane that runs as its developer (one Linux user per account): AgentHub writes the account's auth.json into that developer's ~/.codex as them (0600) just before the pane starts.
  • A host pane never gets one: its CODEX_HOME holds the host's own login.
  • A developer who signed Codex in themselves keeps their own login.
  • While a pane of theirs runs on a pool account, their next pane uses the same account (one auth.json per home).
  • Codex rotates refresh tokens. Every 10 s AgentHub copies a developer's auth.json back into the pool when its last_refresh is newer, so a new pane starts from the newest login — only from a home AgentHub placed that account in, never with a last_refresh in the future, and only when its id_token names the same account and email. The id_token signature is not checked: a developer the account was placed with can still spoil it for others until a real refresh from another home wins it back. Several panes may share one account (checked on codex 0.161: an older refresh token still refreshes).
• Ranking is the Claude pool's: quota ≥ 90% last, then fewest live Codex panes, then $ in 5 h / 7 d. The quota is the newest rate_limits in the rollouts of the sessions that account's runs started (no network), each read only from the CODEX_HOME of the account its workspace runs as, and never one dated in the future.
• A session on an AI Proxy keeps the proxy and does not use the pool.

Ceiling: a pane can read its own account's key ($AGENTHUB_POOL_KEY) or auth.json, like the Claude pool's token.

One Linux user per account

Every pane of a user, an agent's shell included, runs as that user's own Linux account (ah-<username>). An agent in Alice's terminal then cannot read Bob's folders, transcripts or the dashboard's database: the OS stops it, not just the UI. This is phase S3 of docs/plans/server-mode/S3-PLAN.md. It is ON when server mode is on AND /etc/agenthub/server.conf exists (server/lib/linux-accounts.js, s3Enabled); without that file everything below is a no-op and server mode behaves as described above. To install it, follow the operator runbook.

Status (2026-10-09): built and checked on a real machine: the host setup, the accounts, panes, git and file saves as the member, hooks checked by account, reads across homes, shared tools in /opt, and the fixes from the 2026-10-08 security review (P8 F1–F11). Built and tested with fake accounts only: per-member quota (P4), the opt-in plugin baseline (P6) and the Codex account pool (P7). The second review (2026-10-09, P2–P7) is fixed (see What the second review closed).

Not done yet (docs/plans/server-mode/S3-PLAN.md):

• the admin's plugin baseline through managed settings (P6 spike, not run): the opt-in fallback (Plugin baseline) is built; otherwise a member installs plugins in their own terminal (/plugin);
• Codex and Antigravity hooks for members: provisioning installs none, so a member's Codex and Antigravity sessions are tracked from their journals (the pollers read every member's home), not from hooks;
• per-member quota, the plugin baseline and the Codex account pool (P4, P6, P7) are not yet tried with real member accounts or a real Codex login.

The model

• Identity. AgentHub user alice is Linux user ah-alice, home /srv/agenthub/users/alice (0750, owner ah-alice, group agenthub). The name must be lower case: a letter, then up to 28 letters, digits, _ or - (LINUX_NAME_RE). While S3 is on, a user with any other name cannot be created (400 EBADUSER). Admins and analysts get a Linux account too. A workspace's folder decides who runs it (server/lib/run-as.js, accountForPath): a folder under /srv/agenthub/users/<name>/ runs as ah-<name>; any other folder runs as the host account, as before (a workspace made before S3 outside the users root, for example). A folder under the users root whose user is unknown, disabled or not provisioned is an error (409 EMEMBERGONE), never "run it as the host".
• The dashboard. A SYSTEM unit, agenthub.service, runs it as the host account with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (it reads every member's tool files — Claude writes transcripts 0600 — but writes none of them). Every program it starts goes through setpriv --inh-caps=-all --ambient-caps=-all first (server/lib/drop-caps.js), so host panes, git hooks and npm do not inherit the capability.
• Run-as through sudo. Everything done AS a member is sudo -n -u ah-<name> <command>, and the sudoers file allows exactly tmux, git, gh (by the absolute paths in server.conf), /opt/agenthub/libexec/write-as and /opt/agenthub/tools/bin/claude (the plugin baseline) that way — never root. As root, the host may run only /opt/agenthub/sbin/agenthub-provision (create, disable or enable a member) and systemctl start|stop|restart|enable|disable agenthub.service. Members are never in sudoers.
• sudo logs every command line, so nothing secret or private crosses it: a pane's environment (its pane token, a pool token) and its command (the prompt) go into a launch file that write-as writes as the member (0600, from stdin) and /opt/agenthub/libexec/pane-launch reads, deletes and execs. File contents go to write-as on stdin.
• hidepid is required. /proc is mounted hidepid=invisible, with group agenthub-proc (the host account, polkitd) exempt. Without it any account could read another's command lines. install-system stops if the remount fails.
• Hooks are authenticated by the sender's uid, read from the kernel's table of loopback connections (/proc/net/tcp*, server/lib/hook-auth.js), not from anything the hook says.
• The AI Proxy gateway. A pane on an AI Proxy profile gets http://127.0.0.1:<port>/api/proxy-gw/<profile> and its own pane token as the key; AgentHub swaps in the real key upstream (server/lib/proxy-gateway.js, see AI Proxy profiles). A Claude pane gets the token in a per-run --settings file, so a user or project env.ANTHROPIC_* cannot override it.
• Shared tools. Members run every AI tool, node and AgentHub's own scripts from /opt/agenthub (server/lib/shared-tools.js), first on their pane's PATH, with self-update off (DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1).

What install-system sets up

The pieces, and what each is for (the install steps are in the runbook):

Piece	What it is
ah-<name>	Made by agenthub-provision, not by the installer. One Linux user per AgentHub user, home /srv/agenthub/users/<name> (0750, group agenthub): the member owns it, the dashboard reads it, nobody else gets in. .agenthub/{tmux,handoff} (0700) is made by the member: their tmux socket, and the files the dashboard writes for their panes (as them)
groups	agenthub (reads member homes: the host account), agenthub-members (every ah-* account), agenthub-proc (sees every process: the host account, polkitd)
agenthub.service	A SYSTEM unit, User=<host>, with SupplementaryGroups=agenthub agenthub-proc and AmbientCapabilities=CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH: the dashboard can read every member's tool files (Claude writes transcripts 0600), but cannot write them. Every program it starts has the capability removed first (setpriv), so host panes, git and npm do not inherit it. It reads node and the plugin root from <data dir>/runtime/agenthub.system.env, a file the host owns, so a plugin update repoints it without root
/etc/sudoers.d/agenthub	The host may run only tmux, git, gh (by the absolute paths recorded in /etc/agenthub/server.conf), /opt/agenthub/libexec/write-as and /opt/agenthub/tools/bin/claude (the plugin baseline) AS a member, plus, as root, only /opt/agenthub/sbin/agenthub-provision and systemctl start/stop/restart/enable/disable agenthub.service. Members are never in sudoers
/etc/agenthub/server.conf	Root's, 0644: the host account and uid, the users root, the port, and the tmux/git/gh paths sudoers lists. Its presence turns S3 on
write-as, pane-launch	/opt/agenthub/libexec/, root's. write-as <path> [append|replace|private|mkdir|remove] runs AS a member and does the one change, content on stdin. pane-launch <file> starts a member's pane from its launch file
agenthub-provision	The one root command besides systemctl on this unit: create, disable or enable ah-<name>. It refuses an account that exists outside agenthub-members and never deletes anything
/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json	Members' Claude Code hooks, through /opt/agenthub/libexec/member-hook, which does nothing for the host account (its plugin reports). A foreign file there is left alone
hidepid=invisible	/proc (now and in /etc/fstab): an account sees only its own processes, so no member can read another's command line. A token passed with tmux -e is in one
/opt/agenthub/{tools,app}	Owned by the host account: the dashboard updates them, every account runs them. tools/bin holds node and every installed AI tool; this install's hook handler, CLI, MCP server and statusline go in app, with the agenthub launcher in tools/bin. The AI tools are published there after each install or update from the AI Tools page, at server start, and by agenthub server tools. A publish copies a native binary, an npm package's folder, or a script's own version folder. A tool that is not published yet answers a member's start with 409 ENOTSHARED

What runs as the member, and how:

• Panes.

  • Each member has their own tmux server (~/.agenthub/tmux/sock). Every tmux command on it, attaching a browser terminal included, runs as sudo -u ah-<name> tmux …. The dashboard never connects to it as itself: the member controls that socket.
  • sudo logs every command line it runs, so a pane's environment (its tokens) and its command (the prompt) are not on it. write-as writes them to a launch file (0600, from stdin), and /opt/agenthub/libexec/pane-launch reads it, deletes it and starts the command. A prompt pasted later goes in on stdin.
  • A pane gets the member's HOME, CODEX_HOME and PATH (/opt/agenthub/tools/bin first), with DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1 and none of the host's desktop variables.

• Git, gh and file saves.

  • In a member's folder, git and gh run as sudo -n -u ah-<name> git …, so git's own ownership check passes and every file stays the member's.
  • The editor and .gitignore saves go through /opt/agenthub/libexec/write-as.
  • AgentHub's stored git logins are never handed to a member's git, and a password typed in the dashboard is refused (400 EMEMBERCRED): the member signs in to their git host from their own terminal.

• Files a pane reads. These are written into ~/.agenthub/handoff/ AS the member (write-as). The dashboard never writes, changes or deletes anything in a member's home itself: the member could have swapped the name for a link. The files are:

  • the workspace prompt and its context files;
  • the AI Proxy settings: no key, only that pane's own token for the gateway;
  • files dropped into the prompt box;
  • a pane's launch file.

  Codex gets its proxy as -c overrides, never a file in the member's CODEX_HOME.

• Reading a member's files. A transcript, a Codex, Antigravity or Cursor journal, or a file in the workspace is read only when the opened file is a regular file the member owns. A link to another account's file is refused, and so is a FIFO. A journal speaks only for its own account: its session's folder must be inside that home. A member's Antigravity conversation (SQLite, which opens its -journal/-wal by name) is read from a private copy; the walk that turns a Cursor project slug back into a folder follows no link and gives up after 500 folders.

• Hooks. A hook is matched to its sender's Linux account, read from the kernel's table of loopback connections.

  • A member's Claude Code reports through /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json → /opt/agenthub/libexec/member-hook → /opt/agenthub/app/scripts/hook-handler.js.
  • The host's hooks are accepted as before.
  • A member's hook may report only work inside their own home: another account's folder, session or pane is 403 EFOREIGN, and a transcript path outside the home is dropped.
  • Any other account is 403 EPEER.

• Liveness. A member's session counts as alive while the pane holding it lives, because the dashboard cannot read another account's process directory. A session the member started in their own shell ends once it has been idle for the idle timeout.

Not offered for a workspace in a member's folder (403 EMEMBERLANE): the Add-workspace Worktree mode and the runtime layer (lanes up/down/hook, profiles, proof, lane MCP). Both run as the dashboard's own account. Use Repo mode and the prompt box's New worktree instead.

First sign-in. Every account gets AgentHub's own setup once, in the browser: the default agent and permission mode, the look (System, Dark or Light, a theme for each, language, terminal font), the pet and notifications, then a guided tour to the first workspace and session. The choices are stored per account (/api/me/prefs), so they follow the user to any browser; an account that already has a workspace skips it, and Settings → Appearance → Run setup again brings it back.

A member's own Claude Code skips its first-run questions: agenthub-provision marks its onboarding done and trusts the member's home (which covers every folder under it), and the dark/light mode picked in AgentHub becomes Claude's theme. Accepting Bypass Permissions mode stays the member's own choice, made in their terminal.

Plugin baseline (opt-in)

Write /etc/agenthub/plugin-baseline.json (as root) to give every NEW member your plugins:

{ "marketplaces": ["owner/repo"], "plugins": ["name@marketplace"] }

After a user is created, AgentHub runs, as that member and in the background, claude plugin marketplace add <source> for each marketplace and then claude plugin install --scope user <plugin> for each plugin; each result is logged as [plugin-baseline]. agenthub users provision <name> (or --all) runs it again in the foreground. No file, nothing runs. -y is never passed, so a plugin that installs by running a marketplace-declared command fails here; the member installs it from their own terminal. Members add their own plugins with /plugin as usual.

What the second review closed

The 2026-10-09 review looked for ways a member can point the dashboard's own rights (CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, the host account, sudo as any member) at files that are not theirs. Each case below is refused, with a test in server/__tests__/server-s3-review2.test.js:

• A workspace folder swapped for a link. The file view, image view, blame and the file editor resolve the workspace's real path and refuse it (403 EFOREIGN) when it lands in another account's files — another member's folder, the host's home, /etc. The account a read or save runs as is never taken from where a link points.
• A member's git dir naming a path outside their home. The info/exclude line AgentHub adds for a new worktree or .mcp.json is written only when the repo's real git dir is the same account's; a FIFO there cannot hang the dashboard.
• Browsing and branch lists. A developer's GET /api/lanes/browse, the browser's New folder (POST /api/lanes/browse/mkdir, made as the member) and GET /api/lanes/branches stay inside their own folder (403 EFOLDER), and so does a workspace's extra folder (POST /api/lanes/:id/sources/folder, refused before the path is looked at, so the answer says nothing about another member's files).
• The top of a member's home. Its dot folders (.claude, .codex, .config, .ssh, .agenthub…) hold logins and pane tokens: no workspace file view serves them to anyone (403 ESECRET), and the home itself is no workspace.
• Transcripts by session id. A scan by id looks only in the session owner's home, so a file another member plants under that id is never shown.
• Codex journals. A rollout journal sets the status only of a lane in its own account's home, and the newest-40 window is per home.
• A disabled member's sessions. Opening one reads from their home instead of crashing the server, and the liveness reaper skips them instead of stopping.
• Host terminals. A browser terminal's tmux attach (node-pty, which forks outside child_process) is started through setpriv too, so it does not keep CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.
• AI Proxy edits. Editing a profile rewrites a running gateway pane's own settings file (with its own token), and deletes the file of a pane that has ended.

What review round 5 closed

The fifth review (2026-10-09) looked at the dashboard's ONE thread and at who a pane really is. Each case below is refused or bounded, with a test in server/__tests__/server-s3-review5.test.js:

• AgentHub's data dir is never a config file. GET /api/cc-config/file refuses anything in it — the database, the push keys, and each gateway pane's settings file, which holds that pane's live token.
• A member's stopped or flooding tmux server. Every call on it has a 3 s limit and a 1 MiB answer cap; one that hit either is not asked again for a minute. Meanwhile only that member's panes count as unknown (kept, not ended); everyone else's are still checked. Listing a member's panes (every poll: the pane list, the workspace list, the 10 s heal beat, the liveness reaper) never waits for them: it runs in the background and the poll reads its last answer, so a stopped server stalls nobody. Until a first answer, or once the last is 15 s old, their panes count as unknown too. A call a click makes on a member's pane (start, type, stop) still waits, up to the 3 s. Every other synchronous call that runs as a member (git in their folder, write-as) stops after 5 s.
• A member's huge or sparse files. Transcripts and journals are read line by line with a 64 MiB cap per line (a 512 MB line used to crash the server); a whole member file is read only up to a cap (1 MiB for a login or a settings file, 16 MiB for an index or a workflow journal, 256 MiB for a SQLite copy, 64 MiB otherwise); a member transcript over 256 MiB is neither parsed nor snapshotted, and the snapshot keeps a sparse file's holes. The snapshot copy is asynchronous (1 MiB at a time), so a big one never stalls the dashboard for other users, and it lands by rename — never half-written.
• A request that makes a route throw answers 500 instead of stopping the server (a member folder of a gone user crashed POST /api/lanes/worktree).
• Who a pane runs as. A non-admin owns no workspace outside their home (above), a pane's folder is its workspace's account's, and a pane token works only from that account's uid.
• A path an analyst names. Browsing, branch lists and the @ file search stay in their own folder or workspaces, like a developer's.
• Drops are saved where the pane that reads them can read them: as the workspace's account (the client names the workspace), not the dropper's.
• The Codex pool and ChatGPT Teams. A login is the pool's only when AgentHub placed it in that home AND it is the same person (email): every seat of a Team shares one account_id, so a member's own seat is theirs.

Accepted ceilings

• The dashboard process can read any file, /etc/shadow included. sudo needs that file, so the unit cannot hide it (InaccessiblePaths hides only /root). Treat the host account as privileged, and keep it out of the sudo group on a real server: there the sudoers file above is all it may do.
• Anything that runs as the host account can run anything as any member: the sudoers file lets it start tmux as them. A host compromise is every member's compromise.
• install-system installs and runs code from the host account's install, as root. Re-run it only from a tree you trust.
• sudo's log (readable by root and adm) shows members' commit messages, branch names, pull-request titles and file paths, never a token or a prompt.
• A member may point a personal AI Proxy at any URL, so the dashboard will POST to it. They have a shell on the machine anyway.
• The gateway forwards any path under /v1/ to the profile's upstream, and an agent can spend through a profile while its pane lives.
• A Claude pool token is in its pane's environment: the member of that pane can read it (see Claude account pool). The same goes for a Codex pool API key, and for a Codex ChatGPT login written into the member's ~/.codex/auth.json (Codex account pool).
• The Codex pool's quota reading comes from rollout journals, which their member writes: a member can forge the reading of their OWN session (say a pool account is full, or empty) and so steer the balancer for everyone until a newer reading wins. They cannot speak for another account's run: a run's rollout is read only from its own account's CODEX_HOME, and never one dated in the future.
• A member session started in the member's own shell, outside a dashboard pane, counts as alive only until its idle timeout: the dashboard cannot read another account's /proc/<pid>.

Operator runbook

Every command below runs as the host account (the one that runs the dashboard) unless it says sudo. agenthub server install-system calls sudo itself, once.

What a new machine needs before install-system

install-system does not do any of this:

1. A Linux machine with systemd, kernel ≥ 5.8 (for hidepid=invisible), sudo with visudo, the shadow tools (useradd, usermod, groupadd), util-linux (runuser, setpriv at /usr/bin/setpriv, mount), pkill, sha256sum.
2. A host account that is not root, with sudo rights for this one run (take them away again afterwards, see step 9 below).
3. Node (the version AgentHub needs), tmux, git and, if you want it, gh on that account's PATH. Their absolute paths are recorded once, in /etc/agenthub/server.conf and the sudoers file.
4. AgentHub installed for the host account, as the plugin or a checkout (npm run setup && npm run build), and running once (agenthub start).
5. Server mode on, with the first admin: agenthub server setup --hostname agenthub.example.com --admin boss (see Set it up).
6. The AI tools members will use, installed for the host account (the AI Tools page or by hand).
7. The HTTPS reverse proxy (see Put HTTPS in front of it).

Install

agenthub server install-system --dry-run   # print the one sudo command it will run
agenthub server install-system             # install, then switch to the system unit
agenthub users provision --all             # Linux accounts for users made earlier (the admin from setup)
agenthub server tools                      # publish the AI tools to /opt now (the server also does it at start)

What agenthub server install-system does, in order (installSystem in bin/agenthub.js, root half scripts/server/install-system.sh; running it again changes nothing that is already in place):

1. Refuses to run as root. Resolves, as the host account: its name, node, this install's root, the data dir, the port (DASHBOARD_PORT, else 4820) and the paths of tmux, git and gh.
2. As root (sudo bash install-system.sh …), after checking each value:
   1. creates groups agenthub, agenthub-members, agenthub-proc; adds the host account to agenthub and agenthub-proc, and polkitd (if it exists) to agenthub-proc;
   2. creates /srv/agenthub/users (0751 root), /opt/agenthub/{sbin,libexec} and /etc/agenthub (root), /opt/agenthub/{tools,tools/bin,app} (the host account's);
   3. writes /etc/agenthub/server.conf (HOST_USER, HOST_UID, USERS_ROOT, PORT, TMUX_BIN, GIT_BIN, GH_BIN);
   4. installs agenthub-provision, write-as and pane-launch from scripts/server/;
   5. copies node to /opt/agenthub/tools/node/<version> (linked from tools/bin/node) and this install's scripts/ and server/lib/ to /opt/agenthub/app;
   6. writes /opt/agenthub/libexec/member-hook (the port is baked in);
   7. writes /etc/sudoers.d/agenthub, only after visudo -c accepts it;
   8. writes /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json (the member hooks) unless a file that is not AgentHub's is already there;
   9. chmod o-rwx the host's ~/.claude, and warns when the host's home is open to other accounts;
   10. adds the hidepid=invisible,gid=agenthub-proc line to /etc/fstab (backup: /etc/fstab.agenthub-bak) and remounts /proc with it;
   11. writes /etc/systemd/system/agenthub.service and runs systemctl daemon-reload. It does not start it.
3. As the host account again: writes <data dir>/runtime/agenthub.system.env (node, plugin root, port, client dist), sets AGENTHUB_USERS_ROOT in AgentHub's settings file, and disables the systemd --user unit (its tmux panes stay).
4. Stops a dashboard still running without the system unit, then sudo -n systemctl enable and start --no-block agenthub.service, and fails unless the unit is active 3 seconds later.

What a new machine still needs by hand after it:

1. agenthub users provision --all: users created before S3 was on (the admin from server setup is one) have no Linux account yet.
2. Log out and back in once, so your own shell joins agenthub and agenthub-proc (the unit gets them on its own).
3. chmod o-rwx ~ for the host account if the installer warned: the database lives under it.
4. If the installer left a foreign /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json alone, add the member hooks to it yourself: for each of PreToolUse, PostToolUse (both with "matcher": "*"), Stop, SubagentStop, Notification, SessionStart, SessionEnd and UserPromptSubmit, a command hook /opt/agenthub/libexec/member-hook <Event> with "timeout": 5 — and "async": true on PreToolUse and PostToolUse, so Claude Code does not wait a Node start before and after every tool call. Re-running install-system rewrites a managed file it wrote itself.
5. Any other daemon that must see every process (monitoring agents, for example) needs group agenthub-proc: sudo usermod -aG agenthub-proc <it>.
6. A tool agenthub server tools reports as ESHAREDLAYOUT (a script in a shared folder) must be installed under /opt/agenthub/tools by hand.
7. Remove the host account from the sudo group (sudo deluser <host> sudo on Debian/Ubuntu). Re-running install-system later needs it back for that run.
8. Pool accounts, if you use a pool: agenthub accounts add <name> (Claude) or agenthub accounts add <name> --tool codex --api-key|--from <dir> (Codex account pool).
9. Optional: /etc/agenthub/plugin-baseline.json for new members' plugins (Plugin baseline).

Add, disable and enable a user

agenthub users add alice [--role admin|analyst|developer]   # or the Users page
agenthub users disable alice
agenthub users enable alice
agenthub users provision alice      # the Linux account only (a user made before S3, or after a failed create)

• Add creates the Linux account FIRST (agenthub-provision create): useradd ah-alice with home /srv/agenthub/users/alice, group agenthub-members; the home is set to ah-alice:agenthub 0750; as the member it makes ~/.agenthub/{tmux,handoff} (0700) and marks Claude Code's onboarding done and the home trusted in ~/.claude.json. If any of that fails, no AgentHub user is made (502 EPROVISION, with the helper's own words). An account ah-alice that already exists outside agenthub-members, or an existing folder /srv/agenthub/users/alice with no account, is refused. With a plugin baseline file in place, its plugins are then installed as the member in the background.
• Disable disables the AgentHub user and ends their logins FIRST, then locks the Linux account (usermod --lock --expiredate 1) and kills every process of ah-alice (pkill -KILL -u: their tmux server and every pane). A failed lock still answers 502 EPROVISION, but the logins are already gone. A user with no Linux account (made before S3, or a name that does not fit) is disabled without any sudo. Their files stay.
• Enable clears the expiry date (when there is a Linux account) and re-enables the AgentHub user.
• Delete: AgentHub never deletes a user, an account or a home. To remove one for good, disable it, then by hand: sudo userdel ah-alice, and move or delete /srv/agenthub/users/alice yourself. The AgentHub user row stays.
• A name that does not fit (upper case, a dot): provision refuses it (provision --all reports it and goes on with the next user, exit code 1). Create a new user with a fitting name, move the old workspaces' folders into their home (/srv/agenthub/users/<name>/…, owned by ah-<name>) and add them there again. agenthub users assign <workspace id> <name> gives a workspace only to the member whose home holds it, or — for a folder outside the users root, whose panes run as the host — to an admin; anything else answers EOWNERFOLDER.

Upgrade

• Update AgentHub as usual (Settings → Updates, /agenthub-update). The bootstrap repoints the unit by rewriting <data dir>/runtime/agenthub.system.env (a host-owned file, no root) and restarts it with sudo -n systemctl restart --no-block agenthub.service. Panes survive (KillMode=process).
• At start, the server republishes its own scripts to /opt/agenthub/app and every installed AI tool to /opt/agenthub/tools, in the background. An install or update from the AI Tools page publishes that tool right after.
• An update never touches a root-owned file. Re-run agenthub server install-system when a release changes anything under scripts/server/ (provision helper, write-as, pane-launch, the member hook, sudoers, the unit; an install from before the plugin baseline needs it once for the claude sudoers entry), when the port changes (the member hook has it baked in), and when tmux, git or gh moves to another path (sudoers allows only the recorded ones).
• Keep every other AgentHub server off the same database (a dev server on another port). A server without S3 cannot see members' tmux servers, so from v2.7.2 on it leaves any run and workspace under the users root (read from /etc/agenthub/server.conf) alone; a build older than v2.7.2 marks their runs interrupted or abandoned within seconds, and the proxy gateway then refuses those panes (401 not a live pane's token). A dev server that DOES run in server mode (it read AGENTHUB_MODE=server from ~/.config/agenthub/settings.env) but lacks the unit's CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH cannot stat a member's 0700 .agenthub/tmux; from v2.7.3 on that EACCES counts as "maybe running" and the member's list is asked through sudo, never read as "no panes". And a run younger than 20 s is never ended by any server: only the server that started a pane writes it into its own cached tmux list, so another one on the same database had not listed it yet and ended a Codex pane seconds after its start.
• Update now under the system unit restarts through sudo -n systemctl restart --no-block agenthub.service (from v2.7.3). An older build started a detached replacement instead, which kept the port while Restart=always started the unit every few seconds, each start exiting "already running" — systemctl status agenthub.service shows activating (auto-restart) with MainPID 0. Recover with kill -TERM <pid of the server on the port>; the unit then starts on the new code.
• A member's tmux list is re-asked at most every 5 s (one sudo each, which writes three auth.log lines); a pane the dashboard starts or stops shows at once, one that exits on its own within those 5 s.
• Claude Code does not carry a folder's trust down from the member's home (which provisioning trusts): a member may be asked "Trust this folder" once per workspace, in the terminal. AgentHub never answers it for them — it is what keeps a cloned repository's own settings and hooks from running unasked.
• A member's first project folder: a workspace named on a folder that does not exist yet inside their home is created at its first start, AS the member (from v2.7.4; their home itself is no workspace).
• Bypass in a pane's shift+tab cycle (--allow-dangerously-skip-permissions) is offered only to an account that already accepted Claude Code's bypass warning (skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt in its ~/.claude/settings.json) or to a run that starts in bypass itself. Before v2.7.4 every new member's first session opened on that warning, which the Chat UI cannot answer.
• A developer's System page (GET /api/settings/info, GET /api/updates/status) carries no path: not the database's, the hooks file's, the install folder, nor the transcript cache's keys — those are every user's transcript paths.

Undo and uninstall

agenthub server install-system --uninstall   # back to the systemd --user unit

As root it stops, disables and deletes the system unit (only if it is AgentHub's), deletes the sudoers file, the managed settings (only if unchanged since it wrote them), the /etc/fstab line (backup: /etc/fstab.agenthub-bak; /proc is remounted hidepid=off), /opt/agenthub/{sbin,libexec} and server.conf. Then, as the host account, it repoints the systemd --user unit at this install and runs systemctl --user enable --now agenthub.

It keeps /srv/agenthub/users and every home, the ah-* accounts, the groups and /opt/agenthub/{tools,app}. It does not stop members' running tmux servers: disable those users first if they should end. With server.conf gone, S3 is off and server mode works as without it.

To remove everything:

1. agenthub server install-system --uninstall
2. agenthub server off, then agenthub uninstall --yes (the Uninstall button refuses in server mode, ESERVERMODE).
3. By hand, as root, only if you want them gone: userdel each ah-* account, groupdel agenthub agenthub-members agenthub-proc, and delete /srv/agenthub, /opt/agenthub and /etc/agenthub. These hold members' work: AgentHub never deletes them.

Troubleshooting

Symptom	Cause, and what to do
install-system: generated sudoers did not validate	Nothing was installed past that step. Check the tool paths it printed (--dry-run).
install-system: …/managed-settings.json exists and is not ours	Members' Claude hooks are not installed; add them by hand (above).
install-system stops at the /proc remount	The kernel does not support hidepid=invisible (< 5.8). The /etc/fstab line is already added: remove it or restore /etc/fstab.agenthub-bak before rebooting.
a dashboard is still running — stop it first	A dashboard outside both units holds the port: agenthub stop, then run it again.
agenthub.service did not stay up	sudo journalctl -u agenthub -n 50. The unit reads <data dir>/runtime/agenthub.system.env.
502 EPROVISION when adding a user	The helper's own message says why (name, existing account or folder). No AgentHub user was made.
400 EBADUSER	The username does not fit the Linux rule (above).
409 EMEMBERGONE on a start or a git action	The workspace's folder is under the users root but its user is disabled, unknown or not provisioned: agenthub users enable <name> or agenthub users provision <name>.
409 ENOTSHARED on a member's start	That tool is not published to /opt/agenthub/tools yet: agenthub server tools.
403 EMEMBERLANE	Worktree mode and the runtime layer are not offered in a member's folder; use Repo mode and the prompt box's New worktree.
400 EMEMBERCRED	A member signs in to their git host from their own terminal; AgentHub's stored git logins are not used for them.
403 EPEER on a hook	The hook came from an account that is neither the host nor an enabled member, or the uid could not be read.
403 EFOREIGN on a hook	A member's hook named a folder, session or pane outside their own home.
403 EFOREIGN on a file view or save	The workspace's folder is now a link into another account's files. Put the real folder back, or make a workspace on the real one.
A member's runs show as abandoned or interrupted, or Claude in a member's pane gets 401 not a live pane's token	Another AgentHub server older than v2.7.2 on the same database (see Upgrade).
sudo: a password is required in the server log	The sudoers file is missing, or a tool moved off its recorded path: re-run install-system.
[drop-caps] setpriv is missing	Install util-linux's setpriv at /usr/bin/setpriv; until then the dashboard's children inherit CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH.
[plugin-baseline] <name>: claude is not in the shared tools yet	claude is not published to /opt/agenthub/tools yet: agenthub server tools, then agenthub users provision <name>.
[plugin-baseline] <name>: … failed with sudo: a password is required	The sudoers file predates the baseline: re-run install-system.
A member's first Claude run asks about Bypass Permissions	Expected: that consent stays the member's own.

Turn it off

agenthub server off
systemctl --user restart agenthub

Accounts are kept, so agenthub server setup turns server mode back on with the same users.