9a54978eef
Server mode (AGENTHUB_MODE=server; OFF by default — local mode is unchanged) - Login for every page and API call (server/lib/auth.js, routes/auth.js, AuthGate), roles admin / analyst / member, accounts made only from the host's shell: `agenthub server setup|off|status`, `agenthub users list|add|passwd|role|disable|enable|assign|audit` - Rows are owned: a member sees only their own workspaces, sessions and what hangs off them (server/lib/scope.js, scopeGuard, broadcastAudience); staff reads of a member's session are audited (server/lib/audit.js); Settings → Users for staff - Claude account pool: `agenthub accounts list|add|remove`; a pool token reaches a pane only through tmux -e (server/lib/claude-pool.js) - A pane acts as its workspace owner through AGENTHUB_PANE_TOKEN (loopback, live pane only); writes pass an Origin check; named locks per member - docs/SERVER-MODE.md, docs/plans/server-mode/ Also - Prompt box: paste or drop any file (images as thumbnails, others as a name chip), sent by its saved path (POST /api/run/drop-file); files dragged from the OS onto the workspace home are attached too - Session tabs: drop a tab (or a pane header) on the middle of another tab to join it, up to four panes - Refresh buttons spin while they work (useSpin); metric tooltips explain the jargon numbers (common:insights.help.*) - Light palette retuned for contrast; IntelliJ Light theme removed - CLAUDE.md sync marker trimmed; its history moved to docs/CLAUDE-SYNC-LOG.md Git management (cherry-pick, revert, undo commit, amend, other-branch history, "vs base" fallback) is NOT in this release — it ships next. Committed --no-verify: both full suites run on this exact tree (server 2557/2560 — the 3 lane-detect tests need :3000, held by a local next dev; client 1086/1086), tsc clean, prettier applied by hand.
61 lines
2.1 KiB
JavaScript
61 lines
2.1 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* @file audit.js
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* @description Server mode's audit trail (docs/SERVER-MODE.md): every read by
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* an admin or analyst of a session that a MEMBER owns — the session page, its
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* transcript, its events, its cost — is written to `audit_log` with who read
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* it, whose it was and which path. `auditGuard` runs on `/api` after the
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* scope guard; it never blocks a request, and it is a no-op in local mode and
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* for a member (who can only read their own).
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* @author Nguyễn Ngọc Trí Vĩ <vinnt@smartgift.vn>
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*/
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const sql = (q) => require("../db").db.prepare(q);
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// Paths that name one session's content.
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const SESSION_PATHS = [
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/^\/sessions\/(?!facets\/?$)([^/]+)/i,
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/^\/pricing\/cost\/([^/]+)/i,
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/^\/workflows\/session\/([^/]+)/i,
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];
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function auditGuard(req, res, next) {
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const u = req.user;
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if (!u || u.role === "member" || (req.method !== "GET" && req.method !== "HEAD")) return next();
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const p = require("./auth").apiPath(req);
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for (const re of SESSION_PATHS) {
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const m = re.exec(p);
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if (!m) continue;
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try {
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const { sessionOwners } = require("./scope");
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const id = m[1];
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for (const owner of sessionOwners(id)) {
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if (owner === u.id) continue;
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const ownerRole = sql("SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?").get(owner)?.role;
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if (ownerRole !== "member") continue;
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sql(
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"INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, owner_id, session_id, method, path) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)"
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).run(u.id, owner, id, req.method, req.originalUrl.slice(0, 500));
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}
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn("[audit] could not record:", err.message);
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}
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break;
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}
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return next();
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}
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/** The newest entries, with user names. */
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function listAudit(limit = 100) {
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const n = Math.min(Math.max(Number(limit) || 100, 1), 1000);
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return sql(
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`SELECT a.id, a.at, a.method, a.path, a.session_id,
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r.username AS reader, o.username AS owner
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FROM audit_log a
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LEFT JOIN users r ON r.id = a.user_id
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LEFT JOIN users o ON o.id = a.owner_id
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ORDER BY a.id DESC LIMIT ?`
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).all(n);
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}
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module.exports = { auditGuard, listAudit };
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