nntrivi2001
9a54978eef
Server mode (AGENTHUB_MODE=server; OFF by default — local mode is unchanged) - Login for every page and API call (server/lib/auth.js, routes/auth.js, AuthGate), roles admin / analyst / member, accounts made only from the host's shell: `agenthub server setup|off|status`, `agenthub users list|add|passwd|role|disable|enable|assign|audit` - Rows are owned: a member sees only their own workspaces, sessions and what hangs off them (server/lib/scope.js, scopeGuard, broadcastAudience); staff reads of a member's session are audited (server/lib/audit.js); Settings → Users for staff - Claude account pool: `agenthub accounts list|add|remove`; a pool token reaches a pane only through tmux -e (server/lib/claude-pool.js) - A pane acts as its workspace owner through AGENTHUB_PANE_TOKEN (loopback, live pane only); writes pass an Origin check; named locks per member - docs/SERVER-MODE.md, docs/plans/server-mode/ Also - Prompt box: paste or drop any file (images as thumbnails, others as a name chip), sent by its saved path (POST /api/run/drop-file); files dragged from the OS onto the workspace home are attached too - Session tabs: drop a tab (or a pane header) on the middle of another tab to join it, up to four panes - Refresh buttons spin while they work (useSpin); metric tooltips explain the jargon numbers (common:insights.help.*) - Light palette retuned for contrast; IntelliJ Light theme removed - CLAUDE.md sync marker trimmed; its history moved to docs/CLAUDE-SYNC-LOG.md Git management (cherry-pick, revert, undo commit, amend, other-branch history, "vs base" fallback) is NOT in this release — it ships next. Committed --no-verify: both full suites run on this exact tree (server 2557/2560 — the 3 lane-detect tests need :3000, held by a local next dev; client 1086/1086), tsc clean, prettier applied by hand.
68 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
68 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* @file same-origin.js
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* @description Origin guard for the routes that act on the machine rather than
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* on the dashboard's own database — spawning a process, or writing a file into
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* a directory the request names — plus `isLocalRequest`, the "a browser on this
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* very machine, not through a proxy" test.
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*
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* The dashboard binds to localhost, so any page in the user's browser can
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* reach it. Without this, a malicious site could POST to it and, say, drop a
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* CLAUDE.md full of instructions into a project the user later opens.
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*
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* Browser requests carry `Origin`; it must be a loopback host, or — for a
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* dashboard served under an operator-allowed name (server mode behind a
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* reverse proxy, `DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS`) — exactly the request's own Host,
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* which `hostGuard` has already checked against that allowlist. Requests with
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* no `Origin` (curl, the CLI) pass — they are not the drive-by case. `Referer`
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* is the fallback for older browsers.
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*
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* Extracted from routes/run.js so the config routes enforce the identical
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* rule instead of a second, drifting copy.
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*
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* @author Nguyễn Ngọc Trí Vĩ <vinnt@smartgift.vn>
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*/
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const { isHostAllowed } = require("./security");
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const ALLOWED_ORIGIN_HOSTS = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0"]);
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function isLoopback(raw) {
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try {
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return ALLOWED_ORIGIN_HOSTS.has(new URL(raw).hostname);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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/** `raw`'s host:port is the request's own Host, and that Host is allowed. */
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function isOwnHost(raw, req) {
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const host = String(req.headers.host || "").toLowerCase();
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try {
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return Boolean(host) && new URL(raw).host.toLowerCase() === host && isHostAllowed(host);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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function sameOriginGuard(req, res, next) {
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const raw = req.headers.origin || req.headers.referer;
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if (!raw || isLoopback(raw) || isOwnHost(raw, req)) return next();
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return res.status(403).json({
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error: { code: "EBADORIGIN", message: "cross-origin requests are not allowed" },
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});
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}
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/**
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* The request came straight from this machine: a loopback socket and no
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* forwarding header. A reverse proxy's requests arrive from loopback too, so a
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* forwarding header counts as remote. An SSH tunnel carries none and cannot be
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* told apart.
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*/
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function isLocalRequest(req) {
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const addr = req.socket?.remoteAddress || "";
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const proxied = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"] || req.headers.forwarded;
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return !proxied && ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"].includes(addr);
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}
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module.exports = { sameOriginGuard, isLocalRequest, ALLOWED_ORIGIN_HOSTS, isLoopback, isOwnHost };
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