Files
AgentHub/CLAUDE.md
T
nntrivi2001 7c5f30df7d fix(panes): /tui works in panes with workspace instructions
Claude refused `/tui` ("Cannot switch renderers in this session — it has
restrictions a restart can't carry over") in every pane started with
--append-system-prompt-file, i.e. any workspace with instructions (member
panes usually have the owner's). The instructions are now written as the only
CLAUDE.md of a folder of their own (<data dir>/workspace-prompts/<id>/, a
member's prompt-<id>/ in the handoff dir via write-as), passed as one more
--add-dir with CLAUDE_CODE_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORIES_CLAUDE_MD=1. Verified with
Claude Code 2.1.301: the file is listed in /memory and /tui switches. Codex
is unchanged (its pointer line names the same file).
2026-10-16 13:38:09 +07:00

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# Claude Code Working Guide
_Last synced: v2.8.9 (2026-10-16) — workspace instructions reach Claude as a CLAUDE.md in an --add-dir folder (not --append-system-prompt-file), so /tui works._ A change that makes any statement in this file, `AGENTS.md`, or a README wrong — a moved path, a new or changed extension point, a retired rule — updates that file in the same change-set and bumps this marker. **Bump = replace the version/date and a ≤ 1-line summary; never append a changelog here** — details belong in the commit message and `docs/`, because this whole file is loaded into every session.
## Project mission
- Maintain a reliable local-first dashboard for Claude Code session monitoring.
- Preserve real-time behavior (hooks -> API -> SQLite -> WebSocket -> UI).
## Repo map
- `server/`: Express API, hook ingestion, SQLite access, websocket broadcast (includes release-based update detection — `lib/update-check.js` reads the repo's own releases API and `routes/updates.js` exposes status/check/apply, refusing to self-update a `~/.claude/plugins/cache/` install, plus `lib/workflow-ingest.js` which ingests on-disk Workflow-tool run journals — fleets that emit no hooks — and `lib/codex-ingest.js`, which mirrors a `codex` lane's running/idle from the mtime of Codex's own rollout journals (skipping a lane whose hooks are current), `lib/codex-usage.js`, which reads the same journals into `sessions` (`tool = 'codex'`) and `token_usage`, and `lib/codex-hooks.js`, which installs AgentHub's opt-in hooks into Codex's `hooks.json`, and their Antigravity counterparts `lib/antigravity-usage.js` (agy's conversation files → `tool = 'antigravity'` sessions and tokens) and `lib/antigravity-hooks.js` (the named hook `agenthub` in `~/.gemini/config/hooks.json`), and `lib/cursor-usage.js` (Cursor's agent transcripts → `tool = 'cursor'` sessions, no tokens)).
- `client/`: React + Vite UI.
- `scripts/`: hook installer/handler, import, seed, cleanup utilities. (Update detection lives server-side in `server/lib/update-check.js`, keyed on the forge's **newest release** rather than a commit count. `POST /api/updates/apply` has two modes and picks by install kind, never from the request: a fast-forwardable **checkout** merges the release tag `--ff-only`, rebuilds, and self-restarts via `server/lib/self-restart.js` — through our own unit when this process runs in one (`systemctl restart --no-block`, launchd's KeepAlive; a detached replacement beside a `Restart=always` unit crash-loops it), else the detached `scripts/restart-helper.js`; a **plugin-cache** install is handed to `server/lib/plugin-update.js` + the detached `scripts/plugin-update-helper.js`, which runs `claude plugin marketplace update` → `claude plugin update -y` → `plugin-bootstrap.js --force` from the NEW cache dir. Both write the HTTP response before anything stops the process, and every plugin-chain outcome is recorded to `plugin-update.json` in the runtime dir — outside the cache, so it survives the swap and the next server reports it as `last_plugin_update`. Neither mode can run `/reload-plugins`: it is REPL-scoped to the session that invokes it, so an open Claude Code session still reloads by hand for new skills/commands. Elsewhere users run the printed manual command, surfaced in the UI and by `agenthub update-check`. `scripts/cc-update-all-helper.js` is the same detached pattern for the config panel's **Update all** button — marketplaces → every plugin → AgentHub LAST → one reload — journalling each step to `cc-update-all.json` in the runtime dir.)
- `skills/`: this repo's skills. Because the repo root **is** the `agenthub` plugin root, this is also the plugin's skills directory — every skill here ships to anyone who installs the plugin, addressed as `/agenthub:<name>` (bare `/<name>` works as an alias). Put a skill here only if it should reach plugin users. The plugin ships no subagents and no pipeline skill, and depends on no other plugin (Superpowers included) — do not add an auto-install of one back into the bootstrap.
- `mcp/`, `statusline/`, `monitoring/`: opt-in integrations that only READ the running dashboard over HTTP — the read-only MCP server (`agenthub mcp`, docs/MCP.md), the Claude Code statusline (`agenthub statusline install|uninstall`, docs/STATUSLINE.md) and Prometheus/Grafana files for `/api/metrics` (`docker-compose.monitoring.yml`, docs/MONITORING.md). Neither the MCP server nor the statusline is ever registered by the bootstrap; only the user's own command writes `statusLine`, never over a foreign one without `--force`, always with a backup. The MCP server and the statusline find the dashboard through `server/lib/dashboard-url.js`, the CLI's own discovery.
- `.claude-plugin/`: the marketplace plus the root `agenthub` plugin manifest (`"source": "./"` — the whole repo is the plugin). Its hooks are inline in `plugin.json`; its commands live in `plugins/agenthub/commands/`, which is NOT a subdirectory plugin. `scripts/plugin-bootstrap.js` runs from `SessionStart` and owns the writable runtime under `~/.claude/agenthub/runtime/` — it never writes into the plugin cache, which Claude Code replaces on every update. See `docs/PLUGINS.md`.
## Workspaces (lanes)
A **workspace** — called a **lane** in the API, CLI, database and code, which is why every identifier below still says `lane`; `/api/workspaces`, `agenthub workspace(s)` and `--workspace` are the user-facing names over the same handlers (plan: `docs/plans/workspace-rename/README.md`) — is a durable unit of parallel agent work: one working directory, many Claude Code sessions over time. Lanes are keyed by `cwd`, not `session_id`, so they survive session restarts and allow the dashboard to show a pipeline that persists across runs.
**Key points:**
- Sessions are bound to lanes by longest path-boundary prefix match on their `cwd` (set in hook data from `claude` CLI).
- A lane's stage is **declared** by the driving Claude session (via `agenthub stage <stage> [--evidence "..."]`), not inferred by the dashboard.
- **A CLI command resolves its lane by (cwd, tool), never cwd alone.** `resolveLaneArg` (`bin/agenthub.js`) answers in order: `--lane`/leading id → `AGENTHUB_LANE_ID` (every tmux pane the dashboard starts carries it, via `tmux new-session -e`) → `--tool`, else the harness marker (`CLAUDECODE` ⇒ claude; Codex has NO reliable env marker, so it passes `--tool codex`) → the owning lane. Two candidates at one directory and no signal is an ERROR that names both, never a pick — writing a codex session's stage onto the claude lane's card is a lie about which agent did the work.
- **The console never writes a lane's stage.** Declared stages come from `agenthub stage` (a skill calling the CLI command), and inferred stages come from tool-event detection only. **Every non-`claude` lane (`codex`, `antigravity`, any other AI Tools id) carries no pipeline at all:** `codex-ingest.js` (codex) and `antigravity-usage.js` (antigravity, idle only) touch nothing but their `status`, never `stage` or a detection, and the Workspace hides stage, pipeline/feature pickers and PipelineMap for them. Do not bring stage inference back for them. The UI's run console and the Workspace page never call `POST /api/lanes/:id/stage` — that boundary exists because the console observes tool calls but cannot see their outcomes. A lane's stage is the session's truth about progress; the console's observation of tool execution would not be proof of completion.
- **Going back is a declaration, and it takes the nodes ahead with it.** A declaration landing on a node BEFORE the lane's current one (a fix-loop re-entry, or a new request on a lane that already reached `done`) clears the detection columns like every real transition AND drops the `stages` records of every node ahead of it — those belong to the previous pass, and left in place they render `done` with the old work's evidence beside a `current` ring further back, contradicting `progress` (computed from the declared index alone). Records under a key matching no node are left alone: unplaceable, so unprovably ahead. `agenthub feature activate <slug>` is the other half of this — a feature switch archives the outgoing pipeline and clears detection too, because a detection belongs to the feature that produced it.
- **A detection expires, an evidence rule does not.** `recordDetection` skips its forward-only comparison once `detected_at` is older than `DETECTION_TTL_MS` (default 5 min), so a lane can move backwards between work sessions. That window changes only WHICH detection is current — it never relaxes declared-wins (an agent's own claim has no expiry) and never lets an inferred node render `done`. Declared-wins has exactly ONE exception: a declaration on the pipeline's LAST node (`done`) stops vetoing, because the pipeline is over there and a later detection is new work — without it a lane left at `done` rejects every detection for the rest of its life.
- **Working-copy facts live at `GET /api/lanes/:id/git`, never inside `GET /api/lanes`.** That endpoint shells out to git five times; the lane list is polled and re-broadcast on every hook. A cwd that is not a readable repo returns `{available:false}` with HTTP 200 — a normal state, not a fault. The same goes for a lane's PROJECT: repo roots and `git worktree list` are read only by `GET /api/projects` (`server/lib/projects.js`, cached in memory — root per cwd, worktrees 30 s, `POST /api/projects/refresh` drops both), read on demand by Settings and the folder suggestions, never on a poll. The Changes panel fetches it itself (`useLaneGitFacts`, every 30s and after each git write) and fails silently.
- **The Workspace console collapses with CSS, never by unmounting — and it has exactly ONE render site.** Unmounting `RunConsole` disposes the run subscription and drops a live run's rendered history. The same rule binds one level up: `ConsoleArea` lives inside the always-rendered `lane-detail` section in `client/src/pages/Workspace.tsx`, never inside a `{currentLane && …}` branch. A second render site makes React unmount the whole console every time `currentLane` flips — lanes arriving on mount, the selected lane removed, a refetch re-picking the selection — which kills the terminal and lets `LaneConsolePane`'s lane-switch effect wipe a half-typed prompt. Header and info block are the conditional parts; the console is not.
- **A split pane never moves to another parent, and the focus never syncs through an effect.** `PaneGrid` draws every mounted slot as an absolutely placed sibling with a stable key, positioned from `layoutRects` — nest panes in split containers instead and React remounts a terminal on every split, swap or close. `?run=` names the focused pane; every layout change in `ConsoleArea` (`client/src/pages/Workspace.tsx`) goes through `change()`, which computes from the LATEST layout (a ref) and pushes the URL itself with `focusOnly` — a navigation that may only focus a pane already shown, never open one. An effect watching the focus fought the open request in the same commit and ping-ponged forever.
- **Push ingest takes only what a token holder may claim.** `POST /api/hooks/ingest-batch` answers 503 until a token exists; the token (`server/lib/push-token.js`) is shown ONCE and stored as a SHA-256 hash, accepted only from the `Authorization: Bearer` header and compared in constant time. A pushed hook may extend only a session its own `push:<source>` created (`EFOREIGN`), its `transcript_path` is dropped so no local file is ever read from it, and it never touches a lane or a pane. Do not add a GET that returns the token or a route that takes it from a query string.
- **A snapshot is immutable and named by an unguessable token.** `session_snapshots` rows are written once (a trigger refuses UPDATE) under 24 random bytes base64url; redaction is applied AT CAPTURE so a stored blob can never be un-redacted; writes are same-origin. Do not add an update route or a token derived from the session id.
- **A budget is an alert rule, not a parallel system.** `budget` and `cost_threshold` live in `alert_rules` (validated by `validateRuleConfig`, the table has no rule_type CHECK any more) and fire through `fireAlert` → feed, webhooks, push; a budget fires each threshold ONCE per period (deduped on `details.period_start` + `details.threshold`). Spend is always `dailyTokenRows` + `calculateCost` — never a second cost formula. `POST /api/alerts/rules/preview` may never write, fire or broadcast.
- **A report file path is built from ids only.** `server/lib/reports.js` writes under `<data dir>/reports/<id>/` and the download route resolves a run by its ids; no route takes a path or file name from a request, and every value in a report's HTML is escaped.
- **AgentHub ships no third-party pet art, and a pet comes only from an upload or a fixed featured id.** The featured pets are codex-pets.net uploads with no redistribution licence (one is a copyrighted character), so `server/lib/pets.js` downloads them into the user's data dir on a pick — never commit their files, and never add a pet route that takes a URL or a path. Uploads are raster only (an SVG served from the dashboard's origin runs script), a bundle's entries are size-checked from the zip directory before they are inflated, and pet ids are made by the server.
- **AgentHub does not orchestrate:** no chaining, no queue, no retry logic, no gate evaluation. The session in control makes all decisions; the dashboard records the claimed stage and shows evidence. The runtime layer (`agenthub lanes up|down|hook`) does not change this — it offers *primitives* a session calls; nothing in the dashboard sequences them.
- **The runtime never writes `stage`, `status` or `notes`** — only `slot` and `ports`. `status=running` means an AGENT is working, not that a server is listening; merging the two would corrupt `classifyLiveness`. Boot failures live in `LANES_ROOT/.state/lane<slot>/last-error.json` and surface via `GET /api/lanes/:id/runtime`. Same boundary as the console-never-writes-stage rule above.
- **A lane's stack is up or down as a computed fact, never a stored one.** `runtimeFacts` re-derives it from pid files and port probes on every read. A process dies to OOM, a stray `kill`, a reboot — caching a truth AgentHub does not control buys ghost state. Slot allocation is the opposite (fully controlled, must be race-free), so that one does live in the DB, under `withLaneLock` plus a partial unique index.
- **A profile's `profile.env` is parsed, never sourced.** Hooks are executed deliberately; config is only read. Sourcing arbitrary shell from a user's repository into the dashboard process would be a code-execution path. Hook names always come from the fixed allowlist in `server/lib/lane-profile.js`, never from a request.
- **Pipelines are DORMANT: AgentHub ships no template.** The stage machinery (`agenthub stage`, stage detection, features, PipelineMap, `agenthub lanes pipeline|node`) is kept for later development. With no template loaded, pipeline id `default` resolves to an EMPTY pipeline (`EMPTY_PIPELINE` in `server/lib/pipelines.js`: no nodes, progress 0), `createLane` still accepts `default`, `POST /api/lanes/:id/stage` answers 400 `ENOPIPELINE`, and the Workspace hides the stage timer, pickers and PipelineMap for any lane with no nodes. A template JSON dropped into `DASHBOARD_PIPELINES_DIR` turns it back on. The server suite loads its two templates from `server/__tests__/fixtures/pipelines/` (set by `scripts/test-server.js`).
- Nodes render in five states: `failed` (rejected), `current` (now), `done` (with evidence), `passed-no-evidence` (claimed or skipped, amber), `pending` (not reached).
- Liveness: a silent **watcher** (stage matching `/watch|poll/`) or `running` lane is dead after `LANE_DEAD_SEC` seconds (default 300); a silent **idle** lane is at rest, not dead. Silence counts from the newer of the session's last event and the current run's `dashboard_runs.started_at` (`lastEventAge` in `server/routes/lanes.js`; a lane with no session bound — a catalog tool, Codex without hooks — has no signal and stays `active`) — a new run still carries the PREVIOUS session_id until its first hook, and judging it by that session made a fresh run read `dead` until a refresh.
- **Never `rm -rf` a lane.** Destructive lane operations (`reset`, `remove`, `purge`) go through `server/lib/worktree.js`/`server/lib/lanes.js`, never a raw filesystem delete — that's what keeps the three-check destroy guard and the DB bookkeeping in lockstep.
- **The native picker opens only for a browser on this machine, and nothing from the request but a start folder reaches its argv.** `POST /api/lanes/pick-path` refuses a non-loopback socket and any request a proxy forwarded (`EREMOTE`) — behind nginx every request comes from loopback, and the dialog would open on a screen nobody watches. Do not relax that check, and do not let the request name the dialog program, a title or any other argument.
- **Never build a git command as a shell string.** Lane git operations use `execFile("git", [...args])` with an explicit argument array (see `server/lib/worktree.js`'s `git()` helper), never a concatenated/interpolated string passed to a shell.
- **An AI Proxy (called AI Router before v2.5.5) is a SESSION's choice, and only its name comes from the request.** A new session names a profile (`proxy` on `POST /api/lanes/:id/start` / `POST /api/run` — the pre-rename `router` is still accepted —, the **AI Proxy** select beside the model picker); `resolveProxy` (`server/lib/proxy-apply.js`) checks it (`EBADPROXY`, `EUNSUPPORTED` off Claude/Codex) and the key and endpoint come from the store. A profile's `baseUrl` is the proxy's ROOT (a trailing `/v1` is dropped on save and on read): a **claude** pane gets `--settings=<data dir>/proxy-settings/<name>.json` with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` = the root (0700/0600; plus `modelPicker` rows only when the profile sets a user-chosen `behavesAs` — never guess one, it sets the context window Claude Code compacts at; the command-line layer outranks project-local and user settings, so only the PATH is in argv), a **codex** pane gets `-p <name>` and `$CODEX_HOME/<name>.config.toml` with `base_url` = root + `/v1` (its base `config.toml` is never touched); both are rewritten at each spawn, `PATCH /api/ai-proxies/:name` rewrites the existing ones and `DELETE` removes them. `dashboard_runs.proxy` (renamed in place from `router`) records it, and a resume naming none goes back to it. **Never write a proxy into the user's project again** — `.claude/settings.local.json` is shared by every session in the folder and is not in a worktree; `clearLaneProxies` takes the old keys out at start and `lanes.router_profile` stays NULL. Key material never leaves the server: profiles live at `<CLAUDE_HOME>/agenthub-proxies/` (0700/0600; the old `agenthub-routers/` is moved there on first read and left as a symlink for an older build), `GET /api/ai-proxies` reports only `hasKey`, and there is deliberately no route that returns one profile in full. `/api/ai-routers` is the same router under its pre-rename path. **`POST /api/ai-proxies/test` sends a stored key ONLY to the endpoint it was stored against** — a blank `apiKey` falls back to the profile named by `name`, but only while the submitted `baseUrl` still equals the saved one, else `EBADKEY`; it probes `/v1/messages` (Claude) and `/v1/responses` (Codex) and answers `{claude, codex}`. Relax that and the route becomes a way to make the server POST a saved key to any URL a browser names. **Codex's key reaches the pane through tmux's `-e` argv (`AGENTHUB_PROXY_KEY`) and is never typed into it** — `tmux.sendCommand` takes over an idle pane with `respawn-pane` for exactly this reason; a `KEY='sk-…' codex …` line typed with `send-keys` would be rendered to every attached browser, kept in the scrollback and appended to the user's shell history. Do not reintroduce a typed command line there, and do not put a Claude key in argv either. See `server/lib/ai-proxies.js`, `server/lib/proxy-apply.js`.
- **The dashboard's git writes are these twenty-two, and the guards are IN `git-ops.js`, not in the UI.** `POST /api/lanes/:id/git/:action` offers `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `stage`, `unstage`, `discard`, `stage-hunk`, `discard-hunk`, `commit`, `switch`, `branch-create`, `branch-delete`, `publish`, `merge`, `resolve`, `merge-commit`, `merge-abort`, `cherry-pick`, `revert`, `undo-commit`, `amend`, `ignore` — nothing else. `commit`/`amend` with `paths` (the Changes panel's ticked files, JetBrains-style) run `git commit --only -- <paths>` over `resolvePaths`-checked paths, never a conflicted one, and with `hunks` (ticked change blocks) commit from a TEMPORARY `GIT_INDEX_FILE` built from git's own fresh diff (`selectionPatch`, never request text), then reset only those paths' real index entries; `ignore` appends an anchored `/path` line to the lane's OWN `.gitignore` for an untracked path only (`ETRACKED`), never through a symlink. **`publish` is the ONE write that takes a destination from the request** (`{url}`), so it can only give a remote to a repo that has NONE: it refuses before the first commit (`ENOCOMMITS`) and whenever `git remote` prints anything (`EREMOTEEXISTS` — it never re-points a remote, so it cannot redirect a repo that already publishes somewhere), the name is always `origin`, the URL passes `validateRemoteUrl`'s allowlist (`https://` with NO userinfo, `ssh://`, scp-like `user@host:path` — never a local path, `file://`, `ext::`, `fd::`, `git://`, `http://` or anything starting with `-`), it runs `remote add origin -- <url>` then the same `push -u origin HEAD` as `push`, and a failed push removes `origin` again. That is still weaker than the AI-proxy "a key goes only to its stored endpoint" rule — a browser on the dashboard's origin can publish a remote-less repo to any allowlisted host — so do not widen the allowlist or let it touch a repo that already has a remote. **A path in the body is never a path**: `resolvePaths` accepts only what `git status` is reporting as changed right now, which is the whole authorization story for the per-file actions (no `..`, no absolute path, no untouched file). `discard`, `discard-hunk` and `merge-abort` are the irreversible actions and all refuse to run without `confirm: true`; do not add another destructive action without the same gate. `branch-create` never switches (the reason to create one from a lane is a sibling worktree, not moving a working agent's HEAD) and `branch-delete` is `-d`, never `-D`, refusing `main`/`master`/`development`/`develop`, the current branch and one another worktree holds. `pull` is ALWAYS `--ff-only` and `switch` refuses a dirty tree, so neither can invent a merge commit or a conflict underneath a running agent; `push` pushes `HEAD`, never a branch name from the request; `commit` passes its message as one argv element. **The lane is the boundary, not the repo**: a subdir lane's reads and writes stay under its own cwd, and an extra folder (`?source=<id>`, resolved by `sourceFolder` from a `folder` row of THIS lane's `lane_sources`, never a path — `404 ENOSOURCE` otherwise) is its own boundary under every guard here; no read may return a `settings.local.json` (`ESECRET`) — do not add a git read that skips `lanePath`/`isSecret`. **A merge is a history-joining action allowed only because its recovery is a button too** (`merge-abort`) — and `cherry-pick`/`revert` ride the same rule (a non-merge commit by sha, `EMERGECOMMIT`/`EBADSHA`; same clean-tree, repo-root and conflict flow; `merge-commit`/`merge-abort` finish or abort whichever of the three `operationInProgress` finds open; a no-op is aborted again as `EEMPTY`, never left open): it starts only by name, on a clean tree, from a lane at the repo ROOT (`ESUBDIR` — a merge is repo-wide and a subdir lane could not resolve a conflict outside itself), one at a time (`pull`/`switch`/`merge`/hunk actions answer `EMERGING` meanwhile); the ref is looked up in `refs/heads`+`refs/remotes`, never passed through; a conflicted file is resolved only through `resolve` (ours/theirs, or `done` once no conflict marker is left — `stage` refuses a conflicted file that still has markers, `EMARKERS`), and `merge-commit` refuses while anything is unmerged (`ECONFLICTS`). Do not add rebase, a hard/mixed reset or stash here: a dashboard click is the wrong place to start an operation whose recovery needs a terminal, and a hard `reset` already lives behind `worktree.js`'s three-check destroy guard. The ONE reset is `undo-commit` = `reset --soft HEAD~1` (`confirm: true`, repo root, never the root or a merge commit), and it and `amend` act only on the HEAD the request names (`sha`, `ESTALE` once an agent committed past it) and refuse any HEAD a remote-tracking branch already holds (`EPUSHED`); a terminal-started rebase blocks every history action (`EMERGING`) — rewriting a pushed commit is a terminal decision; do not relax that check. A button that looks disabled in `LaneGitBar` is a courtesy; the refusal that matters is the server's. Reads (`/git`, `/git/changes`, `/git/log`, `/git/file`, `/git/raw` — an image's bytes for the viewer, extension-allowlisted and served under a `sandbox` CSP + `nosniff` so an SVG runs no script; keep both headers —, `/git/ls`, `/git/tree`, `/git/branches`) stay unguarded like `/git` always was, and resolve their repo from the LANE ROW (or its session / `lane_sources` row) — `GET /api/lanes/branches` is the only one that takes a path from the request, because its lane does not exist yet.
- **A clone runs as its folder's account with THAT account's own identity, and only the public key ever leaves the server.** `POST /api/lanes/clone` takes a URL only through `validateRemoteUrl` (the `publish` allowlist) and a parent held to the user's own folder like New folder; `server/lib/git-identity.js` runs `git clone` as the folder's account (S3: the member) and writes the identity into the CLONE's config (`core.sshCommand` / `credential.helper=store --file=`), never the user's global config. A member's SSH key and HTTPS store live in their home under `~/.config/agenthub/`, written only through `write-as` (secrets on stdin, never sudo argv/env), the host's under `<CLAUDE_HOME>/agenthub-ssh/` + the shared store below; `/api/me/git` returns only `publicKey`/`hasToken`. The git bar's fetch/pull/push in a member's folder uses that same store (`memberHttpsConfig`; a typed login goes in through `write-as` stdin for the one call), and a store that cannot be read is never rewritten (`ESTOREUNREADABLE`); the private key is only `lstat`ed, never read. The commit author is the ACCOUNT's `git config --global` (`PUT /api/me/git/author`). Do not add a route that returns a private key or a token, or one that writes a git identity outside the clone's own config or the account's own `~/.gitconfig`.
- **AgentHub's git credentials are its OWN store, shared by every user of the install, and git is given ONLY that store when it holds a login for the host.** `server/lib/git-credentials.js` keeps one record per `protocol + host` under `<CLAUDE_HOME>/agenthub-git-credentials/` (0700/0600) and no route ever returns a password (`hasToken` only). `gitConfigFor` runs a network action with `-c credential.helper= -c credential.helper=<ours>` whenever AgentHub holds a login for a repo remote's host or the request carries one — the machine's helpers are left out on purpose: a stale token there would win over the typed one, and git's post-success `store` would copy a use-once token into the OS user's helper. The secret travels in the helper's env or the store file, never argv. A typed credential is accepted only for one of the repo's OWN remote hosts (`EBADHOST`), so a login is never sent to a server it was not typed for, and it is saved only after git SUCCEEDED and `remember` is set. Do not add a route that returns a stored password or a path that forwards one to a host other than its own.
- **A lane's `tool` is its DEFAULT, immutable; a session's tool is the session's choice — and only an AI Tools catalog id ever comes from a request.** `lanes.tool` (default `claude`) is any id `server/lib/ai-tools.js` knows; `createLane` refuses an unknown one (`EBADTOOL`) and one the user disabled (`EDISABLED` — only CREATION asks, an existing lane on a tool disabled since keeps working), and it is deliberately absent from `PATCHABLE`. A NEW session names its own with `tool` on `POST /api/lanes/:id/start` (the home's **AI** select, sent only when it differs from the lane's): `validateTool` again (`EBADTOOL`/`EDISABLED`, 400), and the id only picks a catalog file — the command, args and env still come from that file. A resume keeps its session's own tool (`sessions.tool`), never the request's. `POST /api/run` still takes the lane's tool. A lane whose tool left the catalog answers `ENOTOOL` at start. The sidebar's tool icon is per SESSION (`WorkspaceSessionList`), not per workspace row. A pane has no run form: `RunSetup` is gone from `LaneConsolePane`, and the workspace home's prompt box (`WorkspaceHome.tsx`: AI and ONE Model chip — `ModelMenu` in `RunSetup.tsx`, the model list plus Effort, a proxy's own models on a proxy — inside the box; AI Proxy, Permission and Local / New worktree in a row under it, like Claude Desktop) is the one place a session starts with a prompt (the session view's tab bar `+`, `ConsoleTabs.tsx`, starts a bare CLI or a plain shell — `shell: true`, nothing from the request but the slot; the home's AI menu has the same **Open terminal**). `claude`/`codex` keep their hand-written argv builders (`launcher` in their catalog file — a `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR` file may NOT claim one); every other tool is started by its detected absolute path as `[path, ...args, ...resume?, ...bypass?, ...prompt]`, every piece but the prompt from its catalog file, the prompt ONE argv element or, for an `after-start` tool, a tmux paste buffer (`tmux.pasteText`) after `delayMs`. Codex-only fields (`sandbox`, `approval`) are validated against the fixed allowlists in `server/lib/pty-run.js`. **Bypass args are emitted ONLY when the run request carries `bypass: true`** — the run form's red per-run switch, never remembered — and they come from the tool's catalog file (Codex: `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox`, which then replaces `-s`/`-a`); Claude has none (it has the `bypassPermissions` mode), and `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust` is never emitted. Every pane gets the dashboard's hydrated `PATH` through tmux `-e`. Only `claude`/`codex` are `proxyCapable`; `resolveProxy` accepts only `native` for any other tool, else `EUNSUPPORTED`. `GET /api/run/binary?tool=` resolves through the catalog — the query string never names a command. Do not add a route that takes a command, args or env for a tool from a request.
- **Antigravity hooks are observational only, and never answer a permission.** `server/lib/antigravity-hooks.js` writes only the named hook `agenthub` in `~/.gemini/config/hooks.json`, only on a click, and leaves every other name alone. It installs PreInvocation, PostToolUse and Stop and NEVER PreToolUse: agy reads a PreToolUse answer as a permission decision and DENIES the tool on `{}` (verified on 1.2.13), `allow` would override the user's own permission rules and `ask` would force a prompt — there is no neutral answer. The forwarder must keep printing `{}` and nothing else. The file is global (the Antigravity IDE loads it too), so the route accepts a hook only when its `transcriptPath` lies under `~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/`, and a hook's `tool` is an allowlist (`codex`, `antigravity`, else `claude`). AgentHub never reads the IDE's data.
- **Codex hooks run only because the user trusted them in Codex, and AgentHub never decides that for them.** `server/lib/codex-hooks.js` writes `$CODEX_HOME/hooks.json` only on the user's click, keeps every entry that is not AgentHub's, and never writes Codex's trust (`[hooks.state]` in `config.toml` — read only, to report); nothing may pass `--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust`. The hook command is the STABLE `'<CODEX_HOME>/agenthub-hook.sh' <Event>` because Codex keys trust on the definition: change what the script runs (`refreshScript`), never the command, the timeout or the event list without expecting every user to re-trust. A hook's `tool` is an allowlist (`codex`, `antigravity`, else `claude`), and a Codex hook's `transcript_path` is never stored or parsed as a Claude transcript — only `threadOf` reads it, and only a `rollout-*.jsonl` under `$CODEX_HOME/sessions`.
- **An AI Tools install runs only what a RELEASE catalog file names.** `install`/`update` (like `launcher`) are accepted in built-in files and in the synced copy of the newest release's catalog, never in `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR`, and no route takes a package, URL or argv from a request. Jobs are argv-only (`ai-tool-jobs.js`), stdin closed, one at a time; npm is resolved on the login shell's OWN PATH first (`shellPath()`), because `hydrateShellPath` appends, and the pinned Node's npm would install where the user's PATH never looks; an npm update is refused (`ENOTNPM`) for a tool whose binary is not under `npm prefix -g` (a standalone Codex, say) — it would install a shadowed second copy. A script URL must be https on the homepage's site and is re-checked after redirects. Icons are raster only — an SVG served from the dashboard's origin runs script when opened. Do not add an install source that a browser or a custom catalog file can name.
- **A tool's config editor opens only what a RELEASE catalog file lists, and only an existing text file.** `config` is honoured in built-in and synced-release catalog files (never `DASHBOARD_AI_TOOLS_DIR`), each path `~/`-relative with no `..`, and no route takes a path from the request — `:index` picks from that list. `server/lib/ai-tool-config.js` refuses a missing file (it never creates one), a non-regular, binary or >1 MB file, and any whose basename — or its symlink target's — matches `CONFIG_SECRET_RE` (auth, credential, token, oauth, key files…; `ESECRET`); a save must match the opened `baseSha`, parse when JSON/JSONC, and back up the old text under `<data dir>/ai-tool-config-backups/` first. Do not add a create, a delete, a request-supplied path, or a catalog entry naming a login file. The guard is by NAME only: a listed settings file may still hold an API key (opencode `options.apiKey`, an MCP `env`), and the unguarded GET returns it whole, like the cc-config reads do — do not describe this route as secret-free.
- **A lane's card position is a viewer preference; its name is a lane fact.** The sidebar workspace list's drag/Alt+↑/↓ order lives in `localStorage` (`agenthub.workspace.laneOrder`, `client/src/lib/laneOrderStorage.ts`) and writes NOTHING server-side — `GET /api/lanes` and `agenthub lanes` stay in id order, so no `sort_order` column, no reorder route, no websocket message. Renaming is the opposite: it is `PATCH /api/lanes/:id` with `{title}`, the one lane column a user now types into directly, so `updateLane` normalizes it (`normalizeTitle`: trim, 200-char cap, `null` ⇒ `""`, because clearing is legitimate — every render is `lane.title || lane.cwd`). The rule is the column-wide one, not a special case for the field the UI exposes: `bindable` rejects any non-scalar patch value with `EBADFIELD` (`links` excepted — it is stored as JSON), and the route answers 400 for that AND for the `SQLITE_CONSTRAINT` family, rather than handing better-sqlite3 a datatype throw and reporting 500 on plain bad input.
- **Adopted lanes are not destroyable.** A lane with `kind === "adopted"` may never have its worktree reset or removed; "removing" one only drops the dashboard's own record of it. This is enforced in code (`assertDestroyable`'s first check) — do not add a path that bypasses it.
- **Removing a lane deletes the lane's RECORD and nothing else — for every kind, managed included.** `POST /api/lanes/:id/remove` stops the run and the stack, clears AgentHub's own runtime bookkeeping under `LANES_ROOT/.state/lane<slot>/`, and deletes the row. It calls neither `removeWorktree` nor `removeLaneData`: the working tree, its branch and the lane's database are the USER's data, and a mis-click on a dashboard row may never cost a branch's unpushed code. Deleting those is the user's own `git worktree remove` / `git branch -d` / db drop. Consequently `remove` has no unpushed-commits force-gate (only `reset` does) and no preflight blocker stops it. Do not add a "also delete the worktree" flag back onto this route. (A session's own `claude --worktree` tree is a different thing with its own guarded route — see the session-worktree rule below; a lane's folder is never it.)
- **A lane can hold up to ten tmux sessions (slots 0–9; the Workspace groups them into tabs of up to four split panes) — and only slot 0 is the lane's run.** `agenthub-lane-<id>` is slot 0 and the only one `run_id`/`status` ever record; `agenthub-lane-<id>-<1-9>` are extra sessions on the same lane (`MAX_PANE_SLOT` in `server/lib/pty-run.js`; the `-[1-9]` run id pattern is repeated in `pty-attach.js`, `websocket.js`, `routes/hooks.js` and the client — widen them together). Anything that must stop a lane's agents (`stop`, `reset`, `remove`) goes through `laneRunIds` so no slot survives it; anything that names "the lane's pane" (`agenthub lanes shell`) means slot 0. A client that wants "a new tab" sends `slot: "auto"` and the SERVER picks the first free slot under the lane lock (`409 ERUNLIVE` when all ten are busy) — never a slot computed from the client's own list, which may already be stale.
- **The File Explorer (`server/lib/file-explorer.js`, `/api/lanes/:id/fs/*`) reuses the read path's guards and never replaces silently.** Every path is `lanePath` + the PARENT `resolveInLane`-confined with the last segment kept as a name (so a symlink is moved/deleted as a link, never followed); never in or under `.git`, never a secret, never the workspace folder itself. Writes run as the folder's account — a member's only through `write-as` (`move`/`copy` modes; `writeAsAsync` streams an upload to its stdin) — and a move/copy never crosses accounts (`sameOwner`, `EFOREIGN`). A taken name is settled by `conflict` (`fail` → 409 with `names`, `skip`, `keep`, `replace` = the old one to the trash first). Delete is a move into the account's trash (member: `~/.local/share/agenthub/trash/`, host: `<data dir>/trash/<user id>/`), restorable 7 days. `write-as` is root-installed: a change to it needs `agenthub server install-system` again (`EUPGRADE` until then). A user's HOME is browsed through the same module inside `inHome` (`/api/homes/:who/fs/*`, `server/lib/homes.js` picks the folder): every dot entry at the TOP of a home stays hidden and refused — through a symlink, a download, a zip or as a copy source too — and another user's home is an admin's READ-ONLY, audited view (`EREADONLY`) — except its TRASH, whose restore/purge an admin may run (`TRASH_W` in `server/routes/homes.js`, the owner's trash via `trashKey`, audited with the item id); keep that exception to the trash routes only. A home's Trash is its USER's one recycle bin (`listUserTrash`: home-account store + host store `<data dir>/trash/<user id>/`, items tagged `store`). Do not add a delete that skips the trash, an overwrite without `conflict`, or a request path that is not run through `locate`/`folder`.
- **The whole-file editor and the Files tab's upload are the two non-git writes on the lane file surface, and both live outside `git-ops.js` on purpose.** `git-ops.js` only touches paths `git status` reports as changed; `lane-file-write.js` may save any existing text file, so it must reuse the READ path's guards (`lanePath`, `resolveInLane`, `isSecretOnDisk`) and never be weaker than them, and it saves only over the `baseSha` it was opened at — do not let it create files or touch a binary. `lane-file-transfer.js`'s upload (`POST /api/lanes/:id/git/upload`, issue #78) is the opposite and only that: it CREATES one file (any bytes, ≤ 25 MB) under the same guards, into an existing folder, refuses a taken name (`EEXISTS`, a symlink included) and anything into or named `.git` (a hook there runs on the dashboard's next git call), and writes as the folder's member through `write-as` under S3 — do not let it overwrite, make folders or take a path from anything but `dir` + one plain name. Its `GET …/git/download` twin streams any file through `openSafe` as a `sandbox`ed attachment. The tree, expand-all and quick-open read the disk (`walkFolder`) for a folder that is not a repo.
- **Server tests never touch the user's tmux.** Run them through `npm run test:server` (`scripts/test-server.js`), never a bare `node --test server/__tests__/*.test.js` from inside a lane pane — the suites create and kill real `agenthub-lane-<id>` sessions.
- **An artifact is shared as a SNAPSHOT and installed only into the viewer's own account.** `server/lib/artifacts.js` (`/api/artifacts`): a pinned file or a skill is copied once into `<data dir>/artifacts/<random>/` and every viewer reads only that copy — `raw` serves only a file the snapshot recorded, under a `sandbox` CSP + `nosniff`; a `page` is a `https://claude.ai/…` link only. A developer sees their own rows plus shared ones; only the owner or an admin changes one. Install writes a skill into the CALLER's `~/.claude/skills/` (S3: as them through `write-as`), never over an existing one without `replace` (the old one is moved to `~/.claude/agenthub-replaced-skills/`, never deleted), and runs a plugin's `claude plugin marketplace add`/`install --scope user` as the caller, never with `-y`; an admin's switch (Settings → AI tools, `ArtifactsHubSettings`) turns installs off. An uploaded or written skill is snapshotted under the same checks (paths relative, no `..`, no secret names, zip sizes read before inflating). `POST /api/artifacts/plugin/inspect` clones a user-named https link only to read `marketplace.json`, with every credential helper OFF — never send a login with it. Do not add a route that serves a live file of another user, installs into someone else's account, or takes a plugin command from the request.
- **A workspace's instructions, extra folders and context files are lane facts, and a pane reads them only from the lane's rows.** The one addition is the workspace OWNER's own agent instructions (`user_prefs.instructions`, `PUT /api/me/instructions`, Settings → AI tools), which `launchExtras` puts first — keyed by `lanes.owner_id` (`local` in local mode), never by whoever clicked Start. `lanes.instructions` and `lane_sources` (`server/lib/lane-sources.js`) reach a pane through `launchExtras(laneId, tool)`, which `spawnRun` calls ITSELF — so neither spawn path can take them from a request — and every write is same-origin (`server/routes/lane-sources.js`). A folder must be absolute, exist, be a directory, not be or contain the OS home (`validateHomeDir`) and not be the workspace's own folder; it is the user's, and AgentHub never deletes it. An uploaded file is stored under `<data dir>/workspace-context/<lane id>/` under a name AgentHub derives (never a path from the request), and those copies are the only thing here AgentHub deletes (`ownsFile`): with their row, and with the workspace in `deleteLane`. Claude's `--add-dir` is VARIADIC, so it goes first in the argv where `--permission-mode` ends it, and the text (instructions + context file list + extra folders) is written at every spawn as the ONLY file `CLAUDE.md` of `<data dir>/workspace-prompts/<lane id>/` (a member's: `prompt-<lane id>/` in their handoff dir, via `write-as`), which goes in as one more `--add-dir` with `CLAUDE_CODE_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORIES_CLAUDE_MD=1` in the pane env — never `--append-system-prompt-file`: a custom system prompt is a launch flag Claude cannot carry over a restart, so it refused `/tui` in every pane with instructions (side effect: a CLAUDE.md in an extra folder is now read too); Codex gets one `--add-dir` per directory and `-c developer_instructions=<JSON string>` — the text itself up to 6 KB, else a line pointing at that file. Only `claude`/`codex` take them. Never write them into the user's repo (CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md).
- **A workspace's sessions are the ones it OWNS, never the ones that ran in its folder.** `sessions.lane_id` is stamped by `bindRunSession` (`server/routes/hooks.js`) for the session a dashboard pane holds — first writer wins, a nested `claude -p` excluded — and no route sets it. A Codex/Antigravity session (their hooks are opt-in, so a pane may never learn its session) is also stamped by `claimToolSessions` (`server/lib/dashboard-runs.js`, called by both pollers and once at start): the lane of the newest same-tool dashboard run in the session's folder that was live when the session started, never a Claude session. A new Claude pane is started with `--session-id <uuid>` (`spawnRun`), so its `dashboard_runs.session_id` is known before any hook and a hook that carries no `run_id` (a hook handler older than `AGENTHUB_RUN_ID` forwarding) is still stamped from that run (`laneForSession`). Every workspace session list reads `GET /api/sessions?lane=<id>` — which also counts a still-unstamped session one of the lane's `dashboard_runs` holds, because hooks reach only the lowest-port dashboard on a shared DB and that one may be an older build that never stamps — and shows nothing else (no "other sessions in this folder"). Do not go back to listing a workspace by `cwd`, and do not guess ownership for old history.
- **A session's worktree is `claude --worktree`'s, resolved from the session row — and removing it never forces.** A Worktree start passes `--worktree=<server-made name>` (the `=` form: `-w [name]` eats the prompt otherwise) and Claude Code makes, populates and cleans up `<repo>/.claude/worktrees/<name>`; AgentHub only excludes `/.claude/worktrees/` at the repo root. A git route, a resume or a removal may work in a session's worktree only through `sessionWorktree` (`server/lib/session-worktree.js`: the session owned by the lane, its cwd not the lane's folder, registered by `git worktree list`) — `?session=` on the git routes answers `ENOWORKTREE` rather than falling back to the main folder. `POST /api/lanes/:id/session-worktree/remove` (same-origin, `confirm: true`, refused while a live pane holds the session) is the ONE dashboard path that deletes a worktree: `git worktree remove` with no `--force`, `git branch -d` never `-D`, a live-pid lock refused. Do not add a force, and do not let it touch a lane's own folder.
- **Opening a session never resumes it — only SENDING a message to it does.** The sidebar and a workspace home ATTACH pane 0 to a session's live tmux pane (`/workspace?lane=<id>&run=<runId>`, `attachRequest` on `LaneConsolePane`) or, for an ended one, open it in its workspace like Claude Desktop (`/workspace?lane=<id>&session=<id>`, `client/src/components/lanes/SessionReplay.tsx`: its conversation read-only plus a prompt box; the console is only hidden, CSS). A resume re-reads the whole transcript into context, so it happens only on an explicit action: a message SENT from that replay (`resumeSessionId` + `prompt`, first free slot), the transcript page's **Resume**/**Fork** (`SessionResumeButton.tsx`, behind a warning), or the ticked sessions of the **Resume interrupted sessions?** dialog (`InterruptedSessionsPrompt.tsx`, `GET /api/run/interrupted` — runs whose pane died under them; opening it resumes nothing). The analysis page `/sessions/<id>` is reached from the session view's **Analyst** button (beside Files/Changes in the right panel). Do not add a path that resumes on a click. A resume is refused while a live pane holds the session (`409 ESESSIONLIVE` with that pane's `run_id`) — open that pane instead; a fork makes a new session and is allowed.
- **A `cwd` can back at most one lane per tool, not one lane overall.** Uniqueness is the composite `idx_lanes_cwd_tool` (`cwd`, `tool`), not `cwd` alone — Repo/Adopt mode (`POST /api/lanes/ensure`) lets the same directory carry a `claude` lane and a `codex` lane side by side, shown as two separate cards. `resolveLaneByCwd(cwd, tool)` takes an optional `tool` filter for exactly this; hook ingestion (`touchLaneFromHook`) pins it to the hook's own tool — `claude`, `codex` for a hook posted with `tool: "codex"`, or `antigravity` for one posted with `tool: "antigravity"` (the Codex and Antigravity hook rules above) — so a hook event never touches the other tool's lane sharing the path, and stage detection (`resolveLaneForWork` + `detect`) runs for `claude` only. Worktree mode is unaffected — it already allocates a unique directory per lane.
See `docs/LANES.md` for full guide: stage reporting, custom templates, lane actions, and the five node states.
## Non-negotiable engineering rules
- **When a `agenthub.service` unit of ours owns the server, nothing else may stop it.** The bootstrap that performs a self-update is spawned by the running server, so it lives in that server's systemd cgroup: SIGTERM-ing the server from there exits 0 (which `Restart=on-failure` read as "meant to stop") AND trips `KillMode=control-group`, reaping the bootstrap before it can repoint the unit or write `state.json` — a dashboard dead after every update until some later session bootstrapped again. So `scripts/systemd-service.js` splits the API: `writeUserService` repoints the unit and starts NOTHING, `restartUserService` uses `--no-block`, and `plugin-bootstrap.js` defers that restart past `writeState` and `releaseLock` (`pendingSystemdRestart`). The unit is `Restart=always` and `KillMode=process` — **an update never closes a lane pane, only Quit does**: tmux may have been forked by the dashboard into the unit's cgroup, and `control-group` killed every pane on each restart; do not drop it, nor the transient `systemd-run --user --scope` the FIRST session starts the tmux server in (`server/lib/tmux.js` — the server would otherwise share the cgroup of the dashboard or of the terminal it was started from), and do not add a `killRun`/`killSession` to any update, restart or shutdown path. Do not add a path that stops the dashboard from inside its own cgroup, and do not move the restart earlier. Start-at-login is the USER's switch (`/api/settings/autostart`): no bootstrap or update may enable a unit the user left disabled, and the switch only enables/disables — it never stops the server answering it. `agenthub service install` may keep using `installUserService` — it runs from a user's shell, outside the cgroup. `systemdOwned` additionally requires the unit to be ACTIVE (an installed-but-stopped unit owns nothing; treating it as owner skips the stop and then binds an occupied port). A unit naming a RETIRED plugin root is invisible until a reboot, so `fastPathOk` rejects it via `unitIsStale` (pure fs — that path may never spawn a process) and the bootstrap rewrites it; repairing the unit is NOT restarting the server (`pendingSystemdRestart = systemdOwned && needsServer`), and the detached-spawn fallback is guarded by `needsServer` so a stale unit alone never starts a second server onto a bound port.
- **Quit stops the dashboard through its service manager, and only a server STARTING ends it.** `POST /api/settings/quit` / `agenthub stop` (`server/lib/quit.js`) writes `<data dir>/runtime/stopped`, kills every `agenthub-lane-*` pane, then stops a running unit of ours with `systemctl --user stop --no-block` / `launchctl bootout` (async — `bootout` waits for this very process) and never by SIGTERM, which `Restart=always`/`KeepAlive` would undo; with no unit running it SIGTERMs itself. While the flag exists the bootstrap starts no server (`fastPathOk`, `needsServer`; only `--force` overrides). The flag is cleared ONLY by a server that starts listening (and `agenthub start`) — never by a bootstrap — so an enabled autostart unit still brings the dashboard back at boot/login, and a SessionStart never does.
- **The status-area icon is its own process, and only the user hides or shows it.** `scripts/tray.js` (systray2) is started and kept alive by a production server (`startTrayWatch` in `server/lib/tray.js`), never in server mode; it stops and starts AgentHub only through the CLI's own `agenthub stop|start`, so a Quit from the icon is a Quit. It is on by default; `<data dir>/runtime/tray-off` (Settings → System, or the icon's Hide) is the user's, and nothing else may remove it. A server never kills the icon on restart or Quit — after a Quit it is the way back — and only signals a pid whose `tray.json` heartbeat is fresh.
- **On macOS the same rules bind a LaunchAgent.** `scripts/launchd-service.js` exports the systemd module's API (`service-manager.js` picks by platform — require THAT, never one of the two directly, or a Mac silently gets the systemd no-op): `KeepAlive` is `Restart=always`, `writeUserService` writes the plist and loads nothing, and the deferred hand-over is `bootout` + `bootstrap` (never `kickstart`, which keeps the old plist). Two differences are deliberate: `AbandonProcessGroup` is true so a restart does not take the lane panes' tmux server with it, and because a failed `bootstrap` leaves NOTHING running, the bootstrap falls back to its detached spawn when the restart fails and no server is live. Availability is `launchctl print gui/<uid>` — no GUI login (SSH only) means the detached spawn, as before.
- **A bootstrap that is no longer the installed build does NOTHING, and `--force` does not override that.** `supersededBy` (`scripts/plugin-bootstrap.js`) reads Claude Code's `installed_plugins.json`: if a SIBLING cache directory is the recorded install, this build logs one line and returns `superseded` — no deps, no unit, no server. A Claude Code process that was not restarted after an update keeps loading the OLD cache dir, and without this its every session repointed `agenthub.service` at that old dir and restarted the dashboard onto the version the user just upgraded away from, once per session, forever. It may not hand over to the new build either — the process it would replace is the one loading it. Do not add a path that lets a retired root write the unit, stop the server, or "just" refresh deps.
- **Deleting retired cache copies is the ONE thing here that touches the plugin cache during normal operation (the other is Uninstall, below), and four protections gate it.** `pruneRetiredPluginRoots` never deletes: this build; any `installPath` in `installed_plugins.json`; the dir `agenthub.service` names (`unitRoot`, foreign unit included); any dir named in the user's `settings.json` hooks (a un-restarted Claude Code is still executing from there — deleting it breaks that session's hooks). Plus the newest survivor as a rollback cushion (`KEEP_RETIRED_ROOTS`, 1 — a full copy of this repo is ~130 MB, so the cushion is one build deep, not two), and nothing at all outside `~/.claude/plugins/cache/`. It runs AFTER `writeState`, so a bad prune cannot also cost the record of a good bootstrap. Adding a fifth thing that pins a cache dir means adding a fifth protection here.
- **Uninstall removes only what is AgentHub's, and never the user's work.** `scripts/uninstall.js` (`agenthub uninstall --yes`, `POST /api/settings/uninstall` — `confirm: true`, refused in server mode, run as a detached worker in its own `systemd-run --user --scope`, so no unit stop can reap it) goes in a fixed order: panes → unit (before the server, or `Restart=always` revives it) → servers → icon → stacks → config entries → `claude plugin uninstall` → files → plugin cache → data dir. In a shared file it removes only entries it can prove are its own (the `isOurEntry`/bootstrap hooks, `isOurs` statusline, the Codex/agy `remove()`s, the `# Written by AgentHub` TOMLs, the launcher marker); it removes only the marketplace named `agenthub`, never a shared one; it deletes the plugin cache only once `installed_plugins.json` no longer records `agenthub@*`; and `isSafeDataDir` refuses a data dir that is or contains the home, `CLAUDE_HOME` or the checkout, or is not recognisably AgentHub's. The AI tools' conversations, lane worktrees and branches, and anything in a user's repo are never touched. Every module is required up front, because the cache it runs from is deleted mid-run.
- **A session reload is typed into a live pane, never spawned.** `/reload-plugins` and `/reload-skills` are scoped BY CLAUDE CODE to the session that runs them, so nothing can reload a session from the outside. `server/lib/cc-reload.js` therefore types them into the dashboard's existing tmux lane panes and spawns NO `claude` process — a one-shot `claude -p "/reload-plugins"` reloads only its own short-lived session, exits, and leaves a junk session in the dashboard's own history. Do not add a path that starts a session in order to reload one.
- **A read that scans the events table never runs on the event loop, and never runs a correlated subquery per event.** Node serves every page, hook and websocket from one thread, and better-sqlite3/node:sqlite block it for the whole query — one slow aggregate freezes the dashboard for every user. Put an aggregate that takes more than a few hundred ms at real size into `JOBS` in `server/lib/read-pool.js` (its own `query_only` connection in a worker, timeout, shared in-flight runs); write "the next event of the session" as a window function (`LEAD() OVER (PARTITION BY session_id ORDER BY id)`), not `MIN(id) … id > e1.id`. And do not drop `idx_events_session(session_id, id)` as a "prefix" of another index: only it orders a session's events by id.
- **A headless entry point requires `server/lib/windows-hide.js` before anything reads `child_process`.** The dashboard and its detached helpers have no console on Windows, so every git/npm call without `windowsHide` opened a console window that flashed and stole focus on each poll. `install()` (in `server/index.js`, `plugin-bootstrap.js`, `plugin-update-helper.js`, `cc-update-all-helper.js`, `restart-helper.js`) forces it for every spawn; a new detached script needs the same first line, or a `windowsHide: true` of its own (the statusline's one git call has that).
- **Server mode is a MODE of this codebase, never a fork, and local mode must not notice it.** Everything server-only checks `isServerMode()` (`AGENTHUB_MODE=server`, `server/lib/auth.js`) and is a no-op otherwise; `auth.js` opens the database only on first use, so a module that merely loads it never touches the DB in local mode. Accounts are made from the host's shell (`agenthub server setup`, `agenthub users …`) or by an admin on the Users page (`server/routes/users.js`), where EVERY change needs the admin's own password again (`confirmPassword` in `auth.js`, throttled — EREAUTH/ETOOMANY), never lets an admin demote or disable themselves (ESELF), is written to `audit_log`, and refuses in local mode (ELOCALMODE: no login to check) — do not add an account route without that step-up, and never one that returns a password hash. Rows are OWNED (phase S2, `server/lib/scope.js`): `lanes.owner_id` is the creator (never from the request — `ownerFor(req)`), a session belongs to its workspace (`sessions.lane_id` or a `dashboard_runs` row), and everything else hangs off the session. A `developer` sees only their own rows, and an `analyst` reads every row but writes only their own (`memberId` scopes an analyst's non-GET requests like a developer's — `member` was renamed `developer`, `db.js` migrates it): every list/aggregate passes `req` into `sessionWhere`/`bySessionWhere`/`laneWhere`; every route naming ONE row is covered by `scopeGuard`'s `PATH_RULES` + the query/body id names in `namedIds` (404 `ENOTFOUND`) — a new id route under a new prefix needs a rule there; every WebSocket broadcast type needs a `broadcastAudience` case (an unlisted type reaches no developer); a staff-wide view joins `STAFF_ONLY_PREFIXES`. Admin/analyst reads of a developer's session are written to `audit_log` (`server/lib/audit.js`). A pane carries `AGENTHUB_PANE_TOKEN` (hash in `dashboard_runs.pane_token_hash`, never listed) so the CLI/MCP/statusline inside it act as the workspace owner — accepted only from loopback and only while the pane lives (`userFromPaneToken`). Every write in server mode passes the Origin check in `authGuard`; prefix checks go through `apiPath()` (decoded, case-insensitive), because Express routes `/api/Webhooks` and `%77ebhooks` too. Named locks are namespaced per user, and `named-lock.js` takes only a plain name (a lock name was a path). It is NOT OS isolation unless S3 is installed (next rule); without it every pane runs as the host account, so do not call that multi-tenant. A new route that writes the host's own configuration joins `ADMIN_WRITE_PREFIXES`, and its controls hide behind `usePermissions().isAdmin` (`client/src/components/AuthGate.tsx`) — a hidden button is a courtesy, the server's refusal is the rule; hooks stay loopback-only in server mode.
- **With S3 installed (server mode + `/etc/agenthub/server.conf`, `s3Enabled`), a pane runs as its workspace owner's Linux user, and the dashboard reaches a member only through sudo.** `ah-<name>`, home `<USERS_ROOT>/<name>`; the FOLDER decides (`accountForPath` in `server/lib/run-as.js`), and a folder under the users root with no enabled, provisioned user is `EMEMBERGONE` — never fall back to the host there. Every tmux call on a member's socket (attach included), every git/`gh` call in a member's folder and every write is `sudo -n -u ah-<name> <tmux|git|gh|write-as>` by the absolute paths in `server.conf` (`sudoArgv`; tmux through `/opt/agenthub/libexec/tmux-member` once installed, which runs the member's RUNNING server's own binary so a tmux upgrade never mixes versions); sudoers allows exactly those, plus `/opt/agenthub/tools/bin/claude` for the opt-in plugin baseline (`applyPluginBaseline`), as `%agenthub-members` and NEVER root as a run-as target. **The only root commands are `/opt/agenthub/sbin/agenthub-provision` (create/disable/enable/delete — `delete` is an admin's step-up-confirmed Delete user (`DELETE /api/users/:id`, `auth.deleteUser`: Linux account + home FIRST, rows only after it succeeded) and removes only an `agenthub-members` account and exactly `<USERS_ROOT>/<name>` as a real directory, `rm -rf --one-file-system`, never through a link; it never adopts a non-member account, and otherwise root never touches a path inside an existing home) and `systemctl start|stop|restart|enable|disable agenthub.service`;** do not add a third — a host compromise is already every member's. **sudo logs argv, so nothing secret or private crosses it:** a member pane's env (pane token, pool token) and command (prompt) go in a launch file written by `write-as` from stdin and run by `pane-launch`; file content always goes on stdin. **The host never writes, chmods or deletes inside a member's home itself — only through `write-as` as the member** (`writeFileAs`, `handoffWrite`, `mkdirAs`, `removeAs`, `scratchFile`): the member can swap any name there for a link, and the host's write would follow it. A member's file is READ only through `openSafe`/`readFileSafe*`/`readStreamSafe` (open, then `fstat`: a regular file that member owns, `O_NONBLOCK`), never a plain `fs` read. **Hooks are authenticated by the peer uid** of the loopback connection (`/proc/net/tcp*`, `server/lib/hook-auth.js`), never by anything in the body: host or root = trusted, an enabled `ah-*` = only work, sessions, runs and transcript paths inside its own home (`EFOREIGN`, foreign paths dropped BEFORE any tool mapping reads them), anyone else `EPEER`. **`hidepid=invisible` (gid `agenthub-proc` exempt) is required** — panes' argv/env would otherwise be readable by every account — and `install-system` stops without it. The unit's ambient `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` is dropped for every child (`server/lib/drop-caps.js`, installed first in `server/index.js`, before anything reads `child_process`) — keep it there, and a spawn outside `child_process` (node-pty) takes `ptyArgv`. **The account comes from a path's TEXT, so a path a member can redirect is checked before it is used:** a workspace's real path (`laneRoot` in `git-diff.js`, `EFOREIGN`) and a git dir their git prints (`git-exclude.js`) must stay the same account's (`sameOwner`), a member's home is no workspace, and a READ uses `ownerForRead`, never the throwing `accountForPath`. **A workspace inside a member's home is owned by that member only, and one outside the users root (it runs as the HOST) by an admin only, by the LIVE role** (`assertOwnerFits`: create, assign, every pane start — `EOWNERFOLDER`; demoting or disabling a user ends their host panes): its panes run as the FOLDER's account but carry the OWNER's pane token, which that account can read; a pane's cwd must be that same account's (`ECWDACCOUNT`), and a pane token is accepted only from that account's uid (`peerIsPaneAccount`). A path a non-admin names in ANY request (an analyst's GET too) stays in their own folder or workspaces (`ownFolder`, `insideOwnWorkspace`, `scope.ownCwdQuery`), and the config `file` reads never serve a credential file or anything in the data dir (`isSecretConfigPath`). **A member can stall or flood what the dashboard reads, and it all runs on one thread:** every synchronous sudo into a member is time-bounded (`MEMBER_EXEC`, tmux `memberCall` with a back-off) and a member's tmux failure makes only THEIR panes unknown, never everyone's; a member's file is read with a size cap (`readFileSafe*` `max`), line by line only through `readLines` (never `readline`, which a one-line 512 MB file crashes), and a sparse one is never copied out as real blocks. **S3 fails closed, never to the host:** `serverConf` keeps the last good `server.conf` in server mode if the file stops reading, `tmux.accountOf` throws (never "the host's server") when it cannot tell a session's account under S3, and every non-GET request naming a workspace re-checks `assertOwnerFits` by the LIVE role (`scopeGuard`, `409 EOWNERFOLDER`) — a demoted admin keeps READING their host-folder workspaces but `/up`, `/hook`, a commit or a file write there no longer runs as the host. The AI Proxy gateway marks what it relays (`x-agenthub-via-gateway`) and the dashboard refuses any request so marked (`403 EGATEWAY`), since a personal profile may point back at it from our own trusted uid; a member's launch file refuses a NUL in argv/env (`EBADARG`). Operator steps: `docs/SERVER-MODE.md` § Operator runbook.
- **A pool token reaches a pane only through tmux `-e` (a member's pane under S3: its launch file), and only for the account `pickAccount` chose.** Never type it into a pane, never put it in the CLI's argv, never return it from a route (`poolStatus` has no token field), and never add a route that reads one back — the pool is filled from the host's shell (`agenthub accounts add [--tool codex]`) or by an admin on the Users page (`POST`/`DELETE /api/accounts`, `/accounts` in `ADMIN_WRITE_PREFIXES`, their own password again, audited by account NAME), where the token only goes in. An empty pool must leave every spawn exactly as before. The two exceptions are a Claude login (`server/lib/claude-pool.js` kind `login`, moved in from a saved switch-user profile — the host CLI's own moves with its live login, and the host's home becomes one more placement — or a pasted `.credentials.json`) and a Codex ChatGPT login (`server/lib/codex-pool.js`), which neither CLI reads from an env var: it is written as `auth.json` into a MEMBER's own CODEX_HOME, as the member (`write-as`, 0600), never into a host pane's CODEX_HOME, never over a login AgentHub did not place, and never a second account into a home where a live pane of that member runs on one; `syncBack` copies the newest back. A Claude login's refresh token is single use, so the server is its one refresher (`refreshLogins`, ahead of expiry, pushing the new pair into every home it placed it in), and a pair a member's Claude refreshed first is copied back only once Anthropic confirms the same account (`fetchOwner`). A Codex API key is `-e AGENTHUB_POOL_KEY` plus a `-c` provider whose `env_key` only names it.
- Preserve existing behavior unless explicitly asked to change it.
- Prefer minimal, reversible diffs.
- Never silently weaken safety controls around destructive actions.
- Keep docs updated when behavior, commands, file locations, or workflows change — apply the `update-project-docs` skill automatically at the end of every change-set that alters behavior, config, interfaces, events, schema, CLI commands, or features (do not wait to be asked).
- Every applicable source file you create or update (`.js/.ts/.tsx/.cjs/.mjs/.py/.sh/.css`) must start with the copyright/authorship header — file overview + the exact line `@author Nguyễn Ngọc Trí Vĩ <vinnt@smartgift.vn>`. Formats and audit script: `skills/file-headers/` (verify with `bash skills/file-headers/scripts/check-headers.sh`). This binds every coding agent (Claude Code, Codex, or others).
## Commands you should know
- Setup: `npm run setup`
- Dev: `npm run dev`
- Prod build/start: `npm run build` then `npm start`
- Server tests: `npm run test:server`
- Client tests: `npm run test:client`
- CLI (after setup): `agenthub <command>` — terminal access to the full dashboard surface (`bin/agenthub.js`; `agenthub help` lists commands)
## Testing and verification policy
- **Run only the tests the change touches — never a full suite by default.** Full suites take 5–6 minutes. Backend: `npm run test:server -- server/__tests__/<name>.test.js` (the test files for, or naming, each module you changed). Frontend: in `client/`, `NODE_ENV=test npx vitest related <changed files> --run`. Docs-only changes run no tests.
- Run a full suite (`npm run test:server` / `npm run test:client`) ONLY when it is genuinely needed: the change touches something every screen uses (`Layout`, `Sidebar`, `StatusBar`, `tailwind.config.js`, global CSS, shared hooks/lib — the per-screen snapshots `client/src/pages/__tests__/screens.snapshot.test.tsx` catch that), a shared server core (`server/db.js`, `server/index.js`, `server/lib/auth.js`/`scope.js`, middleware), a dependency or build/test config, or more than ~10 code files; or the user asks for it. Do not re-run a full suite "once more before committing" — the pre-commit hook (`.husky/pre-commit`) already runs the related tests for a small commit and both full suites for a big or risky one.
- If a UI change is intentional, review the snapshot diff and regenerate baselines with `cd client && npx vitest run -u <test file>`; never blindly update snapshots to make tests pass.
- If you cannot run a verification step, state exactly what was not run and why.
## Change guidelines by area
- API routes: preserve response shapes unless change is requested and documented.
- Database: avoid schema changes without migration-safe logic.
- Hooks: keep fail-safe and non-blocking behavior.
- WebSocket: keep message types stable and backward-compatible.
- UI theming: white text sits on `accent-solid` (`bg-accent-solid`, `.btn-primary`, a Switch's on state, a Checkbox tick), never on `accent` — `--accent` is a TEXT colour, too light in the dark themes to carry white.
- UI feedback: report through `toast` (`lib/toast.ts`) and ask through `confirmDialog`/`confirmDiscard` (`lib/confirm.ts`) or `useArmed` — never `alert()`/`window.confirm`; a modal takes `useDialog`, a copy goes through `copyText`, a single-line submit checks `isSubmitEnter`, a Refresh button spins through `useSpin` (`hooks/useSpin.ts`: never `onClick={load}`, and a minimum spin so a cached answer still shows it ran).
- Documentation: include exact commands and paths; keep markdown examples runnable.
## Agent behavior
- Explore first, then implement.
- For larger tasks, propose/check a short plan before broad edits.
- Use file-specific rules in `.claude/rules/` when working in scoped areas.
- Use project skills from `skills/` for repeatable workflows (they ship with the `agenthub` plugin: `/agenthub:<name>`, or the bare `/<name>` alias).